


JPRS-TAC-93-014

30 June 1993



FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-93-014

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**UN Representative on Peaceful Use of Space**  
*OW2306123593 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service  
in Chinese 0818 GMT 12 Jun 93*

[By reporter Liu Qizhong [0491 0366 0022]]

[Text] United Nations, 11 Jun (XINHUA)—Chinese representative Zheng Lizhong said at a conference of the UN Committee for the Peaceful Use of Outer Space here today that China attaches great importance to the technology on the peaceful use of space, and has made positive efforts in promoting and participating in international cooperation in this area.

Zheng Lizhong made the statement while discussing a report prepared by the Science and Technology Panel under the committee. She stressed that it is urgent to use applied space technology to warn, prevent, and assess natural calamities so that relief measures can be worked out and losses minimized.

She said: While such natural calamities as floods, droughts, earthquakes, and land desertification have inflicted enormous losses on Chinese people's lives and property, China has achieved remarkable results in preventing natural calamities through the use of advanced technology. By using remote-sensing satellite pictures along with information monitored on the ground, China has produced drawings of soil erosion in the country, set

up the "Chinese system on water and soil conservation information," installed in some provinces and regions the systems of monitoring drought, using ground information as well as data sent back from satellites, and built a model for monitoring droughts through remote sensing. All these systems have achieved remarkable results in their actual application.

Commenting on international cooperation in peaceful use of space technology, Zheng Lizhong said: The Chinese Government will continue to give active support to UN plans for the use of outer space. In 1993 China has given developing countries two one-year scholarships for training technicians specializing in remote sensing, cartography, and satellite geodetic survey. In 1994, China will work with relevant international organizations in sponsoring an "international seminar on the application of microwave remote-sensing technology" in China to popularize the use of this technology all over the world, especially in developing countries.

Speaking on the Asia-Pacific ministerial meeting for promoting the use of space, a meeting scheduled to take place in Beijing in September 1994, Zheng Lizhong said: "That will be an important event in the Asia-Pacific region and a grand occasion for promoting cooperation in the use of outer space. We welcome our friends to visit Beijing and we expect the meeting will achieve historical success."

## NORTH KOREA

## Next Round of U.S.-DPRK Talks Planned

## ROK Report

SK1906080093 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean  
19 Jun 93 p 2

[Text] The second-stage U.S.-North Korean talks on the nuclear issue will reportedly take place in Geneva in late June or early July at the latest.

The United States and North Korea will announce the date and site of the talks next week. Upon the agreement that the level of the talks will be upgraded to a vice ministerial level [chagwangup], Undersecretary of State Tarnoff will reportedly represent the United States, and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu will reportedly represent North Korea.

An ROK Government official said on 19 June: "The United States has demanded that the high-level talks be held at an early date. However, North Korea has asked the United States to give it some time. As a result, the talks have been delayed for some time."

He also said that the talks would be resumed in two to three weeks, adding that the two countries had no different view on the site of the talks because North Korea had chosen Geneva and because the United States had agreed on it.

He said that the United States plans to discuss the resolution of the nuclear inspection issue first and the improvement of the U.S.-North Korean relations later at the high-level talks. He also said that North Korea plans to propose that it receive nuclear inspections, instead of completely returning to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He added that serious disputes would occur at the talks, as a result.

Meantime, upon returning from a European tour, ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said that as for special inspections, it is not necessary to insist on that particular designation. In this way, he hinted at flexibility with regard to the inspections of the two unreported facilities in Yongbyon.

## KCNA Reports 14 July Talks

SK2906041893 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0405 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Pyongyang, June 29 (KCNA)—Government-level talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America will open in Geneva on July 14, 1993.

The DPRK delegation will be led by Kang Sok-chu, first vice-minister of foreign affairs, and the U.S. delegation by Robert L. Gallucci, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs.

The sides agreed on it on June 27.

## DPRK Envoy in France Gives Interview

SK2906060393 Pyongyang Korean Central  
Broadcasting Network in Korean 2100 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Pak Tong-chun, envoy at the DPRK mission in France, held an interview with a reporter from French international radio on 12 June and talked about the DPRK-U.S. talks.

He referred to the joint statement adopted at the DPRK-U.S. talks in New York and summed up the content of the statement. Referring to the successes achieved in the talks, he said: First, the talks led the United States not to use force of arms, including nuclear weapons, and to give up a threat with that force. The talks included a definite promise from the United States that it would guarantee the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and its peace and security, that both sides would mutually respect each other's sovereignty, that it would not interfere in our domestic affairs, and that it would support the peaceful reunification of Korea.

Second, although the United States and the Western countries have not so far accepted our assertion that the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is essentially a matter of DPRK-U.S. relations and that, therefore, it can be solved only through DPRK-U.S. talks, the DPRK-U.S. talks were held eventually, and their joint statement was issued.

In connection with the promises the United States made in the joint statement, he said: We know well what we should do in conformity with our decision unilaterally and temporarily to suspend the effectuation of the withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for as long as we consider necessary. He also said: What is important is how sincerely the United States will implement the joint statement in the future.

He then answered reporters' questions.

## Envoy to Pakistan Says DPRK Not To Return to NPT

SK2706003293 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2302 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] With the approach of the second-stage U.S.-North Korean high-level talks, which are likely to be held early next month, North Korean Ambassador to Pakistan Choe Su-il said that North Korea would not join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty again [ukhanun haekhwaksan kumji choyage tasi kaiphajinun anulkosirago]. It therefore attracts attention.

A Chinese Government-controlled Beijing radio broadcast reported yesterday: In his 24 June news conference in Islamabad, Choe Su-il criticized that the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] has taken double positions toward North Korea by constantly pressuring it, while overlooking some other countries' nuclear weapons development. He also said that North Korea

would not join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty again as long as it has withdrawn from it.

The Beijing radio broadcast reported: Choe Su-kil said that the IAEA's request for inspection of military facilities [kunsa sisol] in North Korea is not fair. He also asserted that North Korea cannot accept the IAEA's such request.

## SOUTH KOREA

### Joint Effort With Japan Against DPRK Nuclear Program

SK2906105793 Seoul YONHAP in English 1049 GMT  
29 Jun 93

[Text] Seoul, June 29 (YONHAP)—South Korea and Japan agreed Tuesday to jointly counter North Korea's missile development and sale and cooperate for fullscope nuclear inspection on Pyongyang.

Visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Kabun Muto, meeting his South Korean counterpart Han Sung-chu, said the Tokyo government will urge the G-7 summit to adopt a resolution demanding North Korea's compliance with international and inter-Korean nuclear inspection.

On bilateral issues that focused on resolving the unhappy past, Han called for an "objective, reasonable and unbiased" approach. "For this, Han asked that Tokyo admit beyond doubt that force was involved in recruiting comfort women," Yu Pyong-u, Foreign Ministry's director-general of the Asian Affairs Bureau, said after the meeting.

Han raised the issue of some 8,000 Koreans abandoned on the Soviet soil of Sakhalin by the Japanese Government at the end of World War II, and Muto agreed to form a working-level group to negotiate their repatriation and compensation.

Muto had come to Seoul earlier Tuesday for the foreign ministers' talks where North Korea's recent missile tests, nuclear suspicion and resolution of unhappy past between Seoul and Tokyo were key topics.

Muto, expressing "deep concern" at North Korea's recent test of its Nodong-1 missiles known to have at least 1,000km in range, said Tokyo protested the test to Pyongyang through its Beijing embassy but was bluntly told "not to interfere," Yu said.

Han agreed that the action seriously undermines regional peace and promised close cooperation in counter Pyongyang's missile development and sales, he said.

Japan enumerated three conditions to fully solving North Korea's nuclear suspicion—North Korea's return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, compliance with inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and acceptance of inter-Korean nuclear inspection.

The foreign ministers agreed they should work together to see all these requirements met by North Korea, said Yu.

Muto explained that the G-7 summit next month in Tokyo is likely to adopt a resolution demanding the same three requirements.

On the issue of comfort women, a euphemism for tens of thousands of Korean women taken to frontline brothels as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers during World War II, Han asked Tokyo to "show a clear will to learn from the past," Yu said in the post-meeting briefing.

Han made three demands that Tokyo must meet for a clear resolution of history.

"Japan must admit it used force in recruiting the comfort women, reveal every account related to the comfort women, and show the will that it will learn from this part of history," Yu said.

Han addressed Japan's responsibility for some 8,000 Koreans left behind after being forcibly taken to Sakhalin as laborers, telling Tokyo to take preventive measures before this issue, like comfort women, develops into a major diplomatic knot.

Muto replied that Tokyo is studying the matter and agreed to working-level negotiations to formally tackle the issue.

On redressing the heavily imbalanced trade in Tokyo's favor, the two foreign ministers shared a general consensus that the phenomenon must be left to be solved by economic principles.

But Han urged Japan to do its part such as wider opening of its construction market and removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers.

## YUGOSLAVIA

**Zagreb Daily: Bosnian Muslims Have CW Bombs**  
LD2706162593 Belgrade TANJUG in English  
1503 GMT 27 Jun 93

[Text] Zagreb, June 27 (TANJUG)—The army of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina 'has 23 airplane bombs with nerve gas and other chemical substances,' the Zagreb daily VJESNIK said Sunday.

The paper cited confidential sources in the 'Army of Bosnia- Herzegovina headquarters, as well as those in the Middle East.'

VJESNIK claims this was 'somewhat older type of arms but not less lethal and dangerous.'

The arms, as set out, were obtained in Lebanon, transferred to Syria, and then to Iraq. After that the 'bombs

were loaded on trucks with humanitarian aid and Red Crescent insignia was put on the trucks as they passed through Turkey.'

It is added that five specialists for chemical warfare arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina together with the chemical arms deliveries. They are accommodated at the 'Dubrava' air base near Tuzla, central Bosnia.

VJESNIK recalls that Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic stated for Turkish news agency in mid-June that he 'no longer ruled out chemical warfare as the last resort in fighting the Serbs....'

His deputy Ejup Ganic threatened Europe Friday with terrorist actions of Bosnian Moslems, if the international community failed to provide support to them.

Leaders of Bosnian Moslems have previously on several occasions voiced threats of terrorist actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. This was always the case when Bosnian Moslems experienced military defeat.

## INDIA

### UN Envoy on Zone of Peace in Indian Ocean

*BK2206100293 Delhi All India Radio Network  
in English 0830 GMT 22 Jun 93*

[Text] India says no meaningful discussion on a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean can be achieved without the participation of all those who have the military and naval presence in the region. The Indian ambassador, Mr. T.P. Srinivasan, said this at the UN ad-hoc committee of the Indian Ocean in New York yesterday. He said regional disarmament and confidence-building measures are extremely important for stabilizing an atmosphere of peace in different parts of the world, but he stressed the need for a consensus on defining the region or zone to achieve the objective.

## GENERAL

## U.S. Ukraine Policy Eyed

PM2806144393 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
26 Jun 93 First Edition p 7

[Stanislav Kondrashov article: "Unexpected Nuclear Triangle"]

[Text] As before, Washington is striving for nuclear-free status for Ukraine, but it would seem to be changing the route for achieving this aim, and what is more in such a way as to entice Kiev and prompt—initially, at any rate—a negative reaction in Moscow and the Russian Defense Ministry.

There are legal grounds for the discontent insofar as, by changing the route, Washington is deviating from former agreements signed by Kiev. Under these agreements, nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian territory are subject to dispatch to Russia for the purposes of their destruction in line with the START I Treaty.

According to Washington's new thinking, expounded in Kiev at the beginning of June by U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin, the 2,000 nuclear weapons removed from missiles and strategic bombers should be "retained" in Ukraine—under the control of Moscow and Kiev with the good offices of the Americans—before traveling the final road to Russia to be dismantled. The procedure will take as long as it takes Russia and Ukraine to come to an agreement on sharing the profits under the planned sale in the United States of fissionable materials from each weapon.

Together with the appearance of the Clinton administration's new emphasis on security guarantees for Ukraine and promises to compensate the latter more liberally for the nuclear weapons eliminated, this kind of control system should pacify and satisfy the Ukrainians to some degree, which is confirmed by Kiev's official approval of it.

On the other hand, for those in Kiev who still foster nuclear ambitions despite the commitments made, the American proposal provides a toehold for further delays in moving toward nuclear-free status. As we know, appetite comes with eating, and concessions may encourage new demands—indeed, they are already being put forward at a high level. By declaring in the Ukrainian parliament that 46 SS-24 intercontinental missiles should be retained for a while, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma pleased those radicals who would like to hold on to a nuclear bludgeon against Russia's imperial instincts just in case, and confused the entire diplomatic world.

Implement this, and Ukraine will become a nuclear power mightier than Britain, France, and China, rocking the already shaky procedure for nuclear nonproliferation, and setting a bad example for, say, Kazakhstan. Russia does not need such confusion. Do the Americans?

No. In principle, America's approach to the fate of the USSR's nuclear legacy has not altered: Russia emerges in the capacity of the sole beneficiary because a monopoly of that sort is better able to guarantee control over the legacy and its radical reduction in line with the START I and START II treaties.

But... The last 18 months have shown that from the very beginning the agreed question of the legacy has not been resolved in practice and can no longer be resolved within the proposed confines of the CIS, where all agreements on the unified command of joint strategic forces have proved to be nothing but hot air, to which Marshal Shaposhnikov testified personally recently on leaving his ceremonial post of commander-in-chief which was promptly abolished.

So, there is nothing to reproach America for. It edged its way in as the need required, forming a new and distinctive nuclear triangle, as neither Ukraine nor Russia could resolve effectively the problem of the Soviet nuclear legacy between themselves, and time waits for nobody.

The United States' changing role is revealed not only in Les Aspin's "technical" idea on the stages of the route for taking nuclear warheads from Ukraine to Russia. And the matter centers not only on the nuclear triangle (let's hope it is temporary). The Clinton administration intends to cultivate diverse links with Ukraine far more actively than the Bush administration so as to ensure that all of America's interests are not in the one basket of American-Russian relations. The currents of opinion floating around in the Washington air were expounded by THE NEW YORK TIMES when it expressed the view that for the United States to encourage Ukraine's renunciation of nuclear weapons there is a need for an "all-embracing political strategy" not locked solely into nuclear matters.

This strategy should provide first and foremost for "the problems of Ukraine's security to be addressed," and second for "a broadening of U.S. relations with Ukraine based on assistance in conducting reform." The latter should help to shift "the emphasis of Ukrainian debates." These, in the newspaper's view, stray dangerously toward the question of whether Ukraine should or should not be a nuclear power, and in an atmosphere of heightened passions this question has become something of a touchstone for patriotism, stifling the voice of common sense...

Nature abhors a vacuum. The United States cannot but fill the vacuum of uncertainty and the lack of clear prospects which has emerged in relations between Ukraine and Russia. An unexpected triangle is emerging where there has been no success in finding places for systematic and constructive dialogue. At the same time, the Americans will only take the interests of Russia or Ukraine into account to a degree commensurate with the extent to which they coincide with American interests. In the nuclear problem, this coincidence of interests is

evident, and given a rational view of things the Aspin plan, expediently supported by Moscow, may accelerate Ukraine's movement toward nuclear-free status, blocking the moves of opponents of this. On a broader plain, Washington, without waiting to be "invited," has promoted itself of its own accord to the position of arbiter between the two largest states to have emerged in place of the Soviet Union.

As we know, a few days ago yet another effort at such dialogue was undertaken. But Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk, resorting to a favored method, sought to resolve too much at a single Zavidovo "sitting"—the problems with the Russian power workers against the background of the Ukrainian miners' strike, the problems with the controversy owing to the Black Sea Fleet, and the problems with nuclear weapons. The results of previous meetings, alas, do not give great cause for optimism. What was said on the question addressed by us was brief and certain, but too general: "The Russian Federation president has confirmed Russia's readiness, once Ukraine has ratified the START I Treaty and acceded to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to offer Ukraine security guarantees which will come into force after the ratification of these documents by the Ukrainian parliament."

Of course, this formulation, which is in itself realistic, needs to be deciphered in more detail, and by no means does it exempt Moscow from the tasks which Washington has already undertaken in its own way—the tasks of elaborating an "all-embracing political strategy" for relations with Ukraine.

#### International Nuclear Fusion Experts Meet in Novosibirsk

PM1706150193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 15 Jun 93 First Edition p 1

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA/ITAR-TASS report: "Thermonuclear Reactor Unites Scientists"]

[Text] The international conference on open systems of containing thermonuclear plasma is continuing work in Novosibirsk.

Its participants are discussing the state and prospects of research into containing and heating plasma in open systems and creating neutron generators. Taking part in the symposium are scientists from Russia, the United States, Germany, Japan, Georgia, and Ukraine.

#### STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

#### Yeltsin-Kravchuk Meeting

##### Russian Nuclear Security Guarantees

LD1706131293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1307 GMT 17 Jun 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow June 17 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin confirmed during his Thursday meeting with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk the Russian readiness to grant nuclear security guarantees to Ukraine before it ratifies the START I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The guarantees will come into force after the Ukrainian Parliament ratifies the two treaties, according to a communique on the Russian-Ukrainian summit.

##### 'Text' of Communique

LD1706143093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1352 GMT 17 Jun 93

[Text] Moscow, 17 Jun (ITAR-TASS)—The press service of the president of the Russian Federation has circulated the text of the communique on the meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian presidents:

"The Black Sea Fleet situation was discussed during the working meeting between Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, and Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, which took place in Moscow on 17 June 1993, and provision was made for the urgent measures aimed at settling the situation. The presidents examined the development of bilateral relations, including conditions for supplying fuel to Ukraine.

"The presidents agreed to effect the accelerated formation of the Navy of the Russian Federation and the Naval Forces of Ukraine from the former Soviet Union's Black Sea Fleet, and on basing the Russian Navy in Sevastopol and other locations in Ukraine. To this end, they have signed an agreement, subject to ratification, between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on urgent measures to form the Russian Navy and the Naval Forces of Ukraine from the Black Sea Fleet.

"It was agreed that both navies would perform coordinated tasks to defend the common interests of security and stability.

"The presidents decided to set up, within a short time-frame, an interstate commission to implement the aforementioned agreement.

"They have instructed the commander of the Black Sea Fleet to ensure implementation of the appropriate agreements on creating the Russian Navy Fleet and Ukraine Navy, and establishing their bases.

"An agreement was reached in principle to appoint military attaches to the embassies of the two sides, in Moscow and Kiev respectively, in accordance with international practice.

"Striving for the further development of all-embracing ties between Russia and Ukraine, the presidents have agreed:

"—To intensify work on a comprehensive political treaty between Russia and Ukraine.

"—To speed up the signing of an agreement on dual citizenship between Russia and Ukraine, for the purpose of which the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries are instructed to carry out appropriate negotiations in the nearest future.

"—To cooperate in solving the fuel and energy questions on mutually beneficial terms.

"A separate agreement will be drafted on jointly selling off to shareholders [akcasionirovaniye] a number of enterprises from Russia and Ukraine, taking into account mutual interests. The sides have agreed on free trade and the establishment of joint enterprises.

"The president of the Russian Federation confirmed Russia's readiness to grant Ukraine security guarantees before Ukraine ratifies the START I Treaty and joins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the guarantees to come into force after the ratification of these documents by the Ukrainian Parliament.

"The presidents were united in their desire to strengthen friendly, equitable ties of partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and their peoples."

### Kravchuk Talks To Press After Meeting With Yeltsin

#### Security Guarantees

*LD1806165593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1200 GMT 18 Jun 93*

[Address by President Leonid Kravchuk to unidentified correspondents in Kiev—live]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In addition, accords were reached. First, to make more active the preparation of a full-scale political treaty between Ukraine and Russia. And we emphasized right from the beginning that all of the more important issues of the treaty, which exists now, signed in Kiev in 1990, should be reflected in the new treaty. But it should broaden the range of political, economic, and legal international issues.

We agreed to prepare an agreement on joint shareholding, taking into account the mutual interests of some enterprises in Russia and Ukraine. Well, for example, the talk is about the possibility of, say, Ukraine holding shares in enterprises in regions regarding oil and gas. We are extremely interested in this. Russia is interested in holding shares in some enterprises, in taking part in holding shares in some enterprises connected with the processing of oil products and others.

Well, the talk is on clearly defined international principles and laws, which have been adopted by Ukraine and Russia, that is, whatever the situation, the controlling package of shares remains in the state, on the territory of which the enterprise is located.

We also agreed to sign an agreement on free trade and setting up joint enterprises.

Incidentally, on the 24th of this month, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin will visit Ukraine and such agreements and others will be signed.

We also agreed on a stage-by-stage transition to world prices for oil and gas with Russia by 1 January 1994, with parallel transition to world prices for the transit of these goods across Ukraine. That is, this was always a very difficult problem for us. But at these talks, we agreed that world prices for transit too will be correspondingly established.

We also agreed on Russia giving credit to Ukraine on conditions which exist in world practice. We also settled the issue regarding the debts and assets of the former Union on the basis, as we proposed from the very beginning, the zero version, but [words indistinct] premises for embassies of Ukraine, where we so need them. We agreed on this as well.

Russia confirmed the giving of security guarantees to Ukraine before Ukraine ratifies the START I Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There was also a conversation and, on the whole, we defined our positions. Certain international adjustments are still needed on the basis of international documents and on the pricing, and on the prices which exist, on compensation by Russia for nuclear materials contained in the nuclear warheads of our weapons, which have been withdrawn. Naturally, if our treaty is ratified by the Supreme Council, the weapons will naturally be moved to the place designated for their dismantling.

I repeat that all of this was resolved according to the principle of world prices and existing world practice.

It is very difficult, until now we could somehow not come to an agreement on guaranteed servicing of those elements of missile nuclear complexes of Ukraine, which were produced by Russian enterprises. But this time we also agreed on this. That is, taking into account the complexity of the problems, the acuteness and broadness of the problems, which were discussed, I can say that we resolved them in a constructive way, proceeding from realistic possibilities, and the situation which has arisen, and not only according to wishes. [passage omitted]

#### On START I Ratification

*LD1806183793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1210 GMT 18 Jun 93*

[News conference by President Leonid Kravchuk with unidentified journalists in Kiev—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [An ASSOCIATED PRESS/UKRAINIAN WEEKLY correspondent asks Kravchuk whether the START I treaty will be ratified by the end of the current session, due to end in two weeks, and what efforts he will apply toward that end; the correspondent also wants Kravchuk to comment on his remark during his meeting with Boris Yeltsin to the effect that Russia's

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev applied pressure on Ukraine during the visit by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin]

First, I have no precise data that the Supreme Council has only two weeks left for its work. Even if this was said somewhere, the Supreme Council may reconsider this issue. This is not a constitution. The Supreme Council may make a decision on a special regime of work, i.e. such work, such a regime, during which the deputies assemble at any time if need be. By the way, I understood from the speeches by certain deputies today that they are ready for this. Therefore, the documents are being finalized. It seems to me that the main remarks that were made have already been introduced. At any time, the Supreme Council may submit this issue for ratification.

We did not stir up any broad discussion concerning pressure upon Ukraine on the part of some Russian structures, specific, directly mentioned structures, although conceptually we agreed with Boris Yeltsin and with the delegation of Russia. We spoke frankly about this, that we would like a qualitatively new stage of relations between Ukraine and Russia to be linked to this visit. We were sincerely saying that somewhere someone was too hasty, that somewhere someone failed to understand somebody, that somewhere someone failed to understand our Ukrainian mentality, our Ukrainian pain, that the great nation, the nation with historic roots, its own great history and culture, actually never had a state. When we proclaimed independence, when we voted in favor of statehood, we really perceived this as something our grandparents, whose labor... [repeats himself] grandparents, great-grandparents, etc. had been trying to achieve throughout centuries, possibly, even without understanding this.

Of course, we wanted to do everything quickly and efficiently. We did not take something into account. But I was saying that in this difficult time Russia did not always understand us accurately, as far as our striving is concerned, purely human, spiritual, lofty striving. Instead of understanding this, that for us statehood and independence, all this is interconnected.... [sentence unfinished as heard] No such problems ever faced Russia, the Russians, because Russia always had its statehood. Instead of supporting us and helping us, they sometimes failed to do this and we... [sentence unfinished as heard] I said this sincerely and I will say this to you—that I would very much like for this period of elapsed time to teach both us and the Russians, to teach everything, so that Russian democrats understand this better.

Proceeding from this, from the interaction of two great nations, the two great states, because they are neighbors and any.... [sentence unfinished as heard] Believe me, I say this and repeat this all the time, I say this not only today but on any occasion when I speak, that such neighbors and such a great state as Russia, and all our existing relations, they can live and build a state, both Ukraine and Russia, in friendship and interaction only.

Another approach, I repeat this,—I will not say this about Russia; I will say this about Ukraine plainly—means danger for Ukraine, as far as the preservation of its state is concerned. Danger. History must finally teach us something. It must teach everyone. And now, you can hear some wishing to immediately demonstrate their nonexistent strength, others want to bend close to the ground so they cannot be seen, and still others do not know what they want. They just want something and that's it. [passage omitted]

### On Destruction of 130 Missiles

LD1806192493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1210 GMT 18 Jun 93

[News conference by President Leonid Kravchuk with unidentified journalists in Kiev—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Correspondent wants to know whether the president of Ukraine agrees with the thesis forwarded by 162 deputies to the effect that the parliament cannot get down to the final consideration of the START I treaty unless the status of Ukraine as the owner of the nuclear weapons stationed on its territory is confirmed; also wants to know the president's opinion of the thesis according to which nuclear weapons are the best guarantee of Ukraine's security]

[Kravchuk] Of course, the larger the mace, the harder it hits. There is no doubt about it. But there is one more detail: only a very strong person can lift a large mace. This is why I was saying and am saying to you now about nuclear weapons, especially START I: 130 liquid fuel missiles must be destroyed. They already require exactly such an approach: 130 missiles on liquid fuel.

The very fact that Russia admitted it will reimburse us for the nuclear components means that this is the property of Ukraine. Because they reimburse us, not just for the sake of doing it, but because they are reimbursing for property. This is why this issue should be divided into parts.

One cannot just say that if you have nuclear weapons you have strength. First, there is a whole range of problems: ability to service nuclear weapons. It is not by chance that we appeal to Russia with a request for help. As I already said, and we agreed on this, on a guarantee for servicing of these components of nuclear missile complexes that were manufactured by Russian enterprises. As far as the 130 missiles and these nuclear components are concerned, they were manufactured in Arzamas. The key to everything is there. So, we are unable to provide their servicing.

So, it is clear that they must be destroyed and the treaty must be ratified. Because there can be no euphoria, believe me. There can be no euphoria. We are talking about very serious matters. What we can do, we can do; and what we can't do, we cannot; and we should not even

set about doing it. If someone tries, he may do evil, bring additional problems. In other words, I would split this issue into parts.

But then I could say that nuclear weapons are a protection for Ukraine, although, and I repeat this, I support the idea that nuclear weapons today are not a guarantee of saving mankind. They are not. And the sooner mankind understands that they must be destroyed, in all countries of the world, the more mankind benefits from this. But today this issue... [sentence unfinished as heard] If I were saying that Ukraine manufactures all the nuclear weapon components: carriers, warheads, and control systems and is capable of servicing and replacing them, then these would be nuclear weapons. But if we cannot do this, this is only some part of what you are talking about. [passage omitted]

### Russian Commentaries on Kravchuk-Yeltsin Talks

#### TV Report

LD2006212093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Jun 93

[Report over video by station observer Aleksandr Gerasimov; from the "Itogi" news program]

[Excerpts] The past week was in many ways decisive in sorting out Russian-Ukrainian relations. Here with the story is our observer Aleksandr Gerasimov.

[Gerasimov] [Video showing meeting between Yeltsin and Kravchuk, accompanied by other top officials; Black Sea naval ships in port; military hardware, including missiles] The meeting between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, the third in a year, once again ended—in Leonid Kravchuk's words—in opening a qualitatively new stage in the development of relations between the two states, as did the previous two meetings. [passage omitted: a new compromise on the division of the Black Sea Fleet reached; START I not yet ratified by Ukrainian Parliament, but Yeltsin has now agreed to give Ukraine security guarantees].

Some reports say that Ukraine has already received the text of a declaration from Russia which guarantees that Ukraine will not be subjected to attack, either with nuclear or with conventional weapons, that its territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders will be respected, and that it will not be subjected to any economic or political pressure. This declaration, however, does not guarantee untroubled existence for the rest of the world. Russian military specialists from strategic missile forces still contend that the storage and maintenance conditions of nuclear missiles in Ukraine are far from perfect, and that no eventuality can be ruled out. None of the participants in the talks have given any explanations on this point.

There has been no mention of the date and venue of the next meeting between the presidents of Russia and

Ukraine. It has become quite a tradition that talks between them are only held when relations between our countries become strained.

#### 'Victory for Common Sense'

PM2906101193 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
29 Jun 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Kiev and Moscow Agree on Fate of Nuclear Weapons Deployed in Ukraine"]

[Text] It is no exaggeration to call the agreement to be signed by Ukrainian and Russian Prime Ministers Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Chernomyrdin sensational. As this newspaper was going to press there were only hours to go before the formal signing, according to our information. But the leaders of the two states' governments have already agreed to sum up the results of the many months of disputes and political intrigues on the question of the nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory.

The sides have agreed that, under the previously established centralized operations system, Russia and its military specialists will take charge of and, together with Ukrainian specialists, once again comprehensively service the strategic missile warheads and nose sections [golovnyye bloki] of cruise missiles located at two nuclear technical bases in Ukraine. Subsequently these units will be taken to central holding facilities and dismantled.

Moreover, manufacturers' and warranty supervision [avtorskiy i garantiynyy nadzor] by Ukrainian and Russian specialists, manufacturing plants, and general designers of the strategic missile complexes in Pervomaysk, Nikolayev Oblast, and Khmelnitskiy will be resumed. All work there will be carried out by the best-trained officers from the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. Ukraine will remove all the customs and political barriers to this, and both states will begin to finance this process on a shared basis.

The sides also agreed that five strategic missile regiments whose combat systems have come to the end of their normal and extended service lives, will be stood down and broken up in Ukraine within two years (1994 and 1995). A separate agreement is being drawn up on this.

Major Ukrainian plants in Kirovograd, Kharkov, and Dnepropetrovsk, which have been standing idle through a lack of state orders and a lack of funding, will once again be involved in servicing missile systems. Russian enterprises—including Moscow's Khrunichev Plant—will also be involved in this work.

Ukraine will be compensated for the strategic and cruise missile nuclear warheads in the shape of fuel for its nuclear power stations. It will also get its share of the hard-currency revenue for the nuclear-warhead uranium components processed at Russian plants and sold abroad. The main thing is that the concerns of specialists

and the public about the nuclear safety of strategic missile systems and the nuclear warheads deployed in Ukraine which have gone without the necessary technical servicing for more than 10 months will be allayed. The threat of a second, "military" Chernobyl will have been removed.

But the importance of the event due to take place Monday should not be restricted solely to a narrowly technical or economic analysis. Its meaning, in my view, runs far deeper.

We cannot fail to note that the agreement the two governments are concluding removes from the agenda the plan which U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin proposed a couple of weeks ago in Kiev—that the nuclear warheads of missiles deployed in Ukraine be placed under joint international control with U.S. participation, thereby comprehensively guaranteeing their safety. Moscow assessed this option as a thinly disguised attempt by America to gain official access to Russian nuclear secrets. And the fact that Kiev shared the Moscow military's concerns in this situation makes us confident that the contradictions between the neighboring countries' two power departments are not as irreconcilable as they sometimes seem. There is one other fact which should not be overlooked in any analysis of this problem. The agreement on the fate of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine is being signed following the recent meeting in Zavidovo of the two countries' presidents—Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin. This meeting was devoted to the problems of the Black Sea Fleet, where Russia pledged to guarantee Ukraine's safety and territorial integrity, and its partner in the talks pledged to ratify the START I Treaty within the very near future, to promote the fulfillment of the START II Treaty conditions, and not to violate the state's nonnuclear status. The signing of this new document by Kuchma and Chernomyrdin, despite the complex attitude of the Kiev parliament and the national radicals to the problem, is a very bold and politically well-judged [vyverenny] step that will allow Ukraine to escape the grip of the economic crisis more quickly and to retain the respect and confidence of the international community, which had been concerned about the state's ambiguous stance on the Nonproliferation Treaty.

At the same time, the example of Ukraine provides a very specific signal for Kazakhstan, which also as yet has no unambiguous or consistent position with regard to strategic missile systems deployed on its territory, and has failed to reach a final decision on the fate of nuclear weapons.

And, finally, one last point. When I asked leading Moscow experts whether the signing of the agreement could be seen as a victory for Russia in the protracted dispute about the fate of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, they resolutely rejected this assertion.

The new agreement, I was told, gives neither side an advantage. It is just the first step toward solving the

really serious and vexed problems of the former Union's nuclear legacy. But it can quite rightly be seen as a victory for common sense and for state wisdom over unhealthy nuclear ambitions, political intrigues, and amateurish overconfidence. The fight against these sentiments will still be long and hard in both states' parliaments. Although the upcoming signing is an optimistic step.

#### Efforts To Withdraw Arms Welcomed

*LD1706185893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1717 GMT 17 Jun 93*

[ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Boris Krivoshey]

[Text] Moscow, 17 June—"As things are developing, special importance is being attached to the task of ensuring the continuity and guaranteed status of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine. This would be in the interests of Ukraine, Russia, and all states with an interest in security as we pursue the quest for a further strengthening of the regime of non-proliferation of such weapons," says a Russian Foreign Ministry statement issued today.

The statement says that the United States recently put forward a proposal aimed at getting Ukraine to fulfill as soon as possible the international obligation to remove the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. The Russian side welcomes all efforts to achieve this goal. "We see this initiative as signifying that the United States has accepted its share of responsibility for settling the matter of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine," says the ministry.

#### Military Commander Interviewed on START II Issues

*PM1606162393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian 16 Jun 93 p 7*

[Interview with Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, by Sergey Ovsyienko; date and place of interview not stated: "START II: Parity Is Possible and Attainable"]

[Text] **Ovsyienko:** For 6 months now disputes have not abated over the START II treaty. It seemed that in this time it was possible to reach a specific view of the agreement which has been signed. But no, different opinions on this problem are constantly arising. Do you personally, Igor Dmitrievich, have doubts that the treaty will be ratified in the Russian parliament?

**Sergeyev:** I believe this problem must be looked at from the following angle. I am concerned by the attitude displayed toward it by the republics of the former Union on whose territories there are still nuclear weapons. For instance, Belarus has met its commitments in full and has ratified the Lisbon protocol. Kazakhstan has ratified

the treaty but not the Lisbon protocol. Ukraine has done neither, evidently counting on becoming a nuclear power.

It is not ruled out that this complex situation will affect the process of the START II Treaty's ratification in the Russian parliament. Complexities are arising not so much in Russia as beyond its borders.

**Ovsyienko:** If we return to the stance adopted by Ukraine, I want to recall the quite recent words of President Leonid Kravchuk to the effect that the republic's potential does not allow it to keep nuclear weapons on its territory.

**Sergeyev:** So far it is only the president who is saying this, not the Ukrainian parliament which, in my view, is holding futile hearings on this question.

That Ukraine possesses a substantial scientific and technical potential is borne out by the following fact: On its territory (Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd) are two of the three plants for the production of missiles of the latest, fourth generation. In Russia there is one such plant, in Votkinsk. Ukraine used to produce the entire operational guidance and control system and targeting system...

**Ovsyienko:** In your opinion did the Ukrainian president have in mind the republic's economic potential?

**Sergeyev:** Evidently, that is...

**Ovsyienko:** Nonetheless, Igor Dmitriyevich, what is your view of the Russian parliament's stance on the START II Treaty?

**Sergeyev:** It seems to me that our parliament with the aid of military and other experts realizes that the treaty's ratification is essential. After all, under the conditions of the present economic situation it is simply impossible to restore in its full volume the production of missiles which used to be manufactured in Ukraine. But by ratifying the treaty we shall be able to achieve a certain parity with the United States.

**Ovsyienko:** The treaty's opponents justify their stance by the allegedly excessive expenditure on the fulfillment of its terms. What would you say to that?

**Sergeyev:** Our institute, which studies not only the problems of Russia's missile troops but also of its strategic forces in general, has worked on about 200 versions of the START II Treaty. And what is now being discussed is the best for Russia.

**Ovsyienko:** Igor Dmitriyevich, as far as I know the troops are being set tasks for eliminating the missiles. Is that fair?

**Sergeyev:** You know that the strategic missile forces units lack personnel yet we are also being charged with destroying the missiles.

**Ovsyienko:** But who could do that?

**Sergeyev:** I believe those ministries which created them, or enterprises of those departments. For instance, the plants of the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building could carry out the dismantling [rablokirovka] of nuclear warheads and extract the plutonium...

This is a repeat of the story of the treaty on intermediate- and short range missiles when they sought "clean" methods of eliminating them but could think up nothing except the explosion of 1,000 kg of TNT under the missile. Later they decided to destroy them by the launch method but the Americans immediately set a quota—no more than 72 missiles. They were afraid we would start to develop an ABM system with these launches. We did this (however hard for us) to convince ourselves we were standing guard with reliable weapons. At exactly the appointed time without delays or disruptions the missiles were launched in the Chita region...

We shall not destroy a single missile that has not passed its guaranteed service life. It will work off the funds spent on its production and only after that will it be eliminated.

**Ovsyienko:** Since the treaty the missile forces have been mainly emphasizing the "Topol" system. Why?

**Sergeyev:** These complexes accord with the terms of the treaty whereby there should not be destabilizing missile systems on the ground. Included among them are those which have MIRV's on one delivery system. Single-warhead systems are included in the relevant agreements, they do not prompt the opponent to destroy them.

**Ovsyienko:** What analogs to our present complexes do the Americans have?

**Sergeyev:** The famous "Minuteman" missiles which the Americans regularly modernize. Beginning with "Minuteman 1" they have now completed the modernization of the "Minuteman-3," creating an entirely new system. This is very advantageous when a missile on alert duty is improved by degrees. As a result a missile of a previous system has new specifications for its warheads and data input systems... And that is nothing other than a new complex.

In contrast to the Americans with a persistence worthy of better application we have created new types of missiles which compared with preceding ones had small qualitative additions. But they were new missiles with a new identification number, with new Lenin and State Prize winners... We did not develop the infrastructure—the system of operational control and guidance—which undoubtedly would have provided more advantages than the creation of a new type of missile. After all, what would have been developed would have been not a single missile but an entire complex.

**Ovsyienko:** In addition to the "Topol" Russia has missile systems on rail platforms...

**Sergeyev:** They are also on alert duty but the present military-political situation is such that in the view of the military command there is no need for their presence on combat patrol routes. They are at their permanent deployment locations and can be put on a combat patrol route as soon as the need arises. I should add that these missile complexes can also fulfill missions from their permanent deployment locations.

**Ovsyienko:** Does the fulfillment of alert duty tasks presuppose that we have a specific enemy?

**Sergeyev:** Right now we have no permanent enemies. Previously we knew that such an enemy existed on the northern air and space salient and targeting plans against him were compiled. But now a target could appear at zero degrees and at 180, 270, and 360 degrees... Hence the demand for the appropriate weapons: They must be mobile and not only preach [as published] a massive nuclear missile strike. They must be flexible not as regards the launch plan but, for instance, in correcting the missile's flight path.

**Ovsyienko:** The military reform presupposes the creation of absolutely new Russian armed forces, on a different principled basis. What are the paths of the further development of the Strategic Missile Forces?

**Sergeyev:** At the third stage of building of the Russian army strategic forces will appear which will integrate the missile forces and Air Force and Navy nuclear forces. After all, reform means optimizing the army structures.

**Ovsyienko:** It is not a case of abolishing the Strategic Missile Forces as a category of troops?

**Sergeyev:** Strategic forces are being created. But on what basis is another matter. The missile forces have a developed system of operational control and a high degree of combat readiness. Perhaps that will be taken into account.

**Ovsyienko:** In the sixties the missile troops were a political cudgel with which the USSR instilled terror into potential and nonpotential enemies. What tasks now face the Strategic Missile Forces?

**Sergeyev:** If we admit that our army has been depolitized then one task remains: a high degree of combat readiness, nuclear safety, and the solution of the social problems which, as throughout the Russian army, are based on the shortage of housing for the servicemen.

#### **PRAVDA Presents Arguments Against START II**

*PM2406101993 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*

23 Jun 93 p 6

[Candidate of Mathematicophysical Sciences Vladimir Mironov article under "To Disarm, But Sensibly" rubric: "Who Needs the START II Treaty?"]

[Text] On 18 March KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, the central organ of the Russian Ministry of Defense, carried the

article "Why Our Country Needs the START II Treaty" by Lieutenant General Ananii Politsyn.

I wish to analyze the author's train of thought. The lieutenant general makes some claims and then cites his arguments in support of them. Let us take the author's lead.

The chief question is this: How many nuclear charges, of which kinds, does our country need to have in order to ensure its security? Let us leave aside political considerations, which can cause nothing but a headache. For example: Where these charges must be directed if the Russian president maintains that they are not targeted on the United States and if he now considers the United States his ally (it is better to keep quiet altogether about the U.S. position with regard to its newfound "ally"). Maybe even one nuclear charge is too many for us if we are surrounded only by friends? Let us analyze the military, technical, and economic aspects of the theses of the article's author. Let us show the author's arguments for START II and also the counterarguments against it.

**First thesis.** Some 3,000 (even 2,500) charges are sufficient for Russia.

**For.** Our weapons will mainly be mobile, and the United States is reducing its nuclear potential, so that it will be inadequate to destroy our strategic forces.

**Against.** Our mobile complexes differ substantially from the original idea of the U.S. MX complex, according to which a missile is housed in a "subway," which conveys it between dozens of underground, well-defended launch positions. There is no need to destroy our mobile complexes with nuclear weapons. It is quite sufficient simply to "overturn" ["uronit"] the car carrying the Topol or to blow a couple of wheels off the tow truck transporting the missile.

**For.** These weapons are sufficient to defend Russia and its allies in the commonwealth, since the United States does not have a good ABM system.

**Against.** The Gulf war showed that the existing Patriot ABM system successfully fulfills the role of an ABM system. At the same time this system knocks out a less vulnerable kind of missile—operational-tactical missiles, whose approach time is exponentially less than that of a strategic missile. In addition, the United States interprets the ABM Treaty in a narrow sense—as a ban only on ABM missile systems. Therefore it cannot be ruled out that by the year 2003 it will possess an ABM system based on different physical principles.

**For.** There must be a good intelligence system and a system to warn of a missile attack, and then it is possible to reduce charges to the level set by the START II Treaty.

**Against.** Precisely this is an argument in favor of not reducing strategic nuclear weapons without such a system. But, under the same ABM Treaty, this system

can be located along the borders of the country (the USSR), i.e. mostly outside Russia.

**Second thesis.** The potential of the Strategic Rocket Forces must not be maintained at the level of START I.

**For.** Missiles with multiple reentry vehicles are produced in collaboration with nearby foreign countries, and heavy missiles with 10 multiple reentry vehicles in Ukraine.

**Against.** The author presupposes that modern arms systems exist which are produced without collaboration with nearby foreign countries. The naivete of this viewpoint of the author is perplexing.

**For.** The missile service warranty periods expire by the year 2003, and ecology does not permit the risk of keeping old missiles on alert duty.

**Against.** The Strategic Rocket Forces consist not only of missiles but also of costly underground launch complexes, hardened against the eventuality of even a nuclear attack, whose operating life certainly cannot expire by 2003. A characteristic and close example is the ground launch complex from which Soyuzes have now been blasting into space for decades.

By regularly carrying out test launches of rockets, it will be possible to ascertain their fitness for combat use at no special cost.

The author's adherence to the warranty period gives rise to a number of everyday questions. If the warranty period of a television set, refrigerator, radio receiver, or motor vehicle expires—it is, as a rule, one year—does he throw all this out onto the dump? Before getting into his official Volga, does he ask the driver: "Has the car's warranty expired today?" Most likely he does not. So why, then, is he prepared to dump valuables created by millions of people over decades? Therefore, in the existing economic situation for our peoples, it is more useful to reach agreement on the production of heavy missiles for Russia in Ukraine than to develop such a missile anew here.

**For.** It is cheaper to build 10 missiles with a single warhead than one missile with 10, and single warheads are better.

**Against.** It will once again be necessary to mention launches. So, 10 missiles means 10 crews, 10 support systems, etc. If what the author advocates were fair, we would have to remove Kalashnikov assault rifles from the arsenal at once and arm the army with single-shot rifles. They are accurate, long-range, and strong, and the mujahidin fought with them, after all.

**Third thesis.** We must not reduce the level of our nuclear potential outside the START II framework.

**For.** This will lead to the total elimination of the country's nuclear status.

**Against.** The systematic scrapping of hardware never leads to a disaster if systematic work is carried out to replace it naturally—with more economical and efficient models.

**Fourth thesis.** Reductions must be carried out only within the START II framework—this is the most effective means of ensuring the country's security.

**For.** No arguments.

**Against.** Further down in the same article we read: "It seems that we would be unable to attain this level (1,300 charges in the Strategic Rocket Forces) by 2003—economic factors would prevent this." Where is the general's logic? He has just written that START II is the most effective means of reducing nuclear arms. But then, suddenly—the country's entire might will be insufficient to bring the Strategic Rocket Forces into line with the START II Treaty after the reductions. Thus, START II envisages not a reduction in Russia's existing Strategic Rocket Forces but their rout.

**Fifth thesis.** The aviation component of Russia's strategic nuclear means will remain the same: 350-500 warheads.

**For.** The word "obvious."

**Against.** There is nothing obvious here. Which aircraft will carry these charges? Tu-95, Tu-160? But, according to the president, we no longer make them. If missiles will have gone out of commission by 2003, what can be said about aircraft, which must not stand still, like missiles, but must fly? The author does not admit that Ukraine will supply us with missiles, but he is absolutely certain, to judge from his estimates, that it will let us have strategic bombers.

**Sixth thesis.** There will be more charges on submarine-launched ballistic missiles than in the Strategic Rocket Forces.

**For.** Arguments are not cited, as this is written in the START II Treaty.

**Against.** If this happens, will it benefit us? A submarine is a "taxi" for missiles, while a ground launch is their home. Is it cheaper to travel by taxi all day long or to stay at home all day? The answer is obvious. So, does no one travel by taxi? Yes, they do. But who? Rich people. But what about the poor? They sit at home. Even if they have a car, it is mainly laid up. Just think for yourselves: Whose submarines will be on alert duty in the ocean, and whose will lie at their moorings? A nuclear-powered submarine at its moorings is not a weapon but a potential Chernobyl for the country off whose coast it is moored because, in addition to missiles, it also has a nuclear reactor on board.

The general also saw the treaty's shortcomings. In his opinion, there are three.

First, the United States still has the possibility of quickly restoring the number of charges on missiles. Second, the United States will be able to put back into commission up to 100 nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Third, sea- and air-launched cruise missiles are not taken into consideration.

It is impossible to disagree with this, but the author does not indicate the treaty's chief shortcoming. This is the inequality of the rights of the parties to the treaty—an inequality enshrined in its text. In what does it consist? In this: Russia must physically destroy the lion's share of the most effective part of its strategic nuclear weapons. The United States promises partially to break up but not to destroy the basis of its strategic nuclear weapons. That is, Russia will be unable, should the need arise, to restore its initial potential for several years, while the United States will restore it within minutes. In the case of heavy bombers it will not be obligatory to do even this. This is a precedent which could have far-reaching consequences. The chief of these is the insuperable desire of one of the sides to conclude START III (if the START II Treaty is ratified), which will be still more inequitable and will, as far as possible, include an article with roughly this substance: "Russia (the CIS) eliminates all its strategic nuclear forces, and the United States pledges not to use the strategic nuclear forces which it has against Russia (the CIS)." It is clear that the general will object to such a treaty, but it will already be too late, so would it not be better for him to think about this today?

It would be interesting to learn how, within the framework of the START II Treaty, the first deputy chief of the Center for Military Strategic Studies [Ananiy Politsyn] will advise the General Staff to plan a counter strike? How many warheads will there be, in his opinion, on board the Minuteman missile flying toward Russia? One or three? If there is one warhead, such a General Staff is not worth a plugged nickel; but if there are three, such a treaty is not worth a plugged nickel.

**Disarmament Expert on Treaty Implementation**  
PM2206135793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 22 Jun 93 p 3

[Article by Gennadiy Khromov, Russian Federation Defense Industry Committee disarmament expert: "Provisions of Treaty Are Being Implemented"]

[Text] Of late articles have appeared in certain publications whose authors claim that the Russian Federation has come out with some kind of "new initiatives" on telemetric data transmitted from strategic missiles during test launches. Thus, it is claimed, an additional source of leaks of important secret information is opened up, which could do considerable damage to the country's defense capability.

I will not venture to judge what motivated the writers of these articles. Perhaps they were after another scoop, or

perhaps incompetence is that commonplace in our country. But it is all the more important to find out how things actually stand.

Within the framework of their pledges under the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction and Limitation Treaty (the START Treaty) signed 31 July 1991 the Soviet Union and the United States renounced the coding and jamming of telemetric data during launches of strategic ballistic missiles. The sides acted on the obvious logic that with the easing of international tension and the move to real arms control the preservation of coding cannot be seen as anything but an anachronism. Moreover, when the treaty was signed it was agreed that even if it did not come into force within the year (although no one then could have imagined that the USSR would break up and that Ukraine would be to blame for delaying ratification of this document) such an obvious provision as the noncoding and nonjamming of telemetry should nonetheless be observed.

A year on the parties to the treaty (now the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine) have acknowledged the need to comply with its spirit and implement the main provisions of the treaty and have decided to continue the accepted practice of transmitting telemetry without coding and jamming. A ruling on this matter was issued during fall 1992 in the form of corresponding statements on behalf of the governments of all the above five states.

So, what "new Russian Federation initiative" can there be? After all, the accords that have been reached are not unilateral. They apply equally to Russia, the United States, and the other parties to the treaty.

One must also remember the following. The START Treaty envisages that once it has come into force telemetry should be used as an additional means of monitoring [kontrol] its key provisions such as, for instance, the number of warheads on a particular type of missile. In this connection it was agreed that once the treaty has come into force the sides will exchange magnetic tapes bearing information about each launch and certain initial firing data making it possible to obtain information from these tapes for verification. And nothing more! Then it is up to each country's specialists how they protect its interests. At any rate it may be asserted that access to the missiles' most important specifications and performance characteristics—such as accuracy, combat readiness, degree of protection, the operating parameters of the automated mechanism [parametry raboty avtomatiki], etc—can be safely barred to "prying eyes."

What is more, in order to restrict access to the most sensitive information (information that has no bearing on the parameters monitored) the treaty allows information transmitted from the warheads to be coded during 11 launches a year. Not to mention the fact that we and the United States use nonstandard delivery vehicles to test [otrobotka] the warheads for which no restrictions at all are envisaged on the means of transmitting the

telemetry. So the claims that via this telemetry warhead data are transmitted enabling the United States or anyone else to "make flexible adjustments to their ABM systems" is, to put it mildly, totally unfounded.

Now, until the START Treaty comes into force, magnetic tapes containing recorded telemetry and the corresponding initial firing data are not being handed over although the specific procedure for this handover has been coordinated within the framework of the activity of the special committee whose task is to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the START Treaty.

#### **Ukrainian Commentary Reviews Aspin, Morozov 7 June News Conference**

*AU1706154793 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER  
in Ukrainian 15 Jun 93 p 2*

[Oleh Oliynyk commentary: "The Military Are Becoming Diplomats"]

[Text] As we have already reported, a news conference was held on 7 June on the results of U.S. Secretary for Defense L. Aspin's visit to Kiev.

The U.S. guest and Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel General K. Morozov, speaking before journalists, expressed their satisfaction with the meeting, which was the first at such a level. Mutual understanding was achieved on many issues of interest to both sides. The Ukrainian minister of defense was invited to visit Washington (the visit should take place around July), where a memorandum on mutual understanding between the military departments of our countries will be signed.

Speaking about trends of possible cooperation, Morozov stated that a permanent working group will be formed in the near future to work on practical measures for implementing the accords. In particular, this concerns advanced training of Ukrainian officers in military schools in the United Nations and the exchange of delegations.

Aspin, in turn, made special mention of Ukraine's contribution to the peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia. People in the United States are sincerely grateful to our state and to its servicemen for this contribution. We believe that it is in the United States' national interests to see an independent and economically viable Ukraine, said Aspin.

In his opinion, Ukraine must be a nuclear-free state. The U.S. side points out with satisfaction that President Kravchuk has once again confirmed his position on the need to ratify START I and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Also, it has become clear that this problem is a matter of concern in Ukraine, among a section of parliamentary deputies. Aspin is also aware of this.

In general, at the news conference, the U.S. secretary for defense acted like a diplomat rather than head of a military department, avoiding giving negative answers to

any of the journalists' questions. Even when they dealt with additional financing by the United States for the disarmament process in Ukraine, the possibility of storing warheads on our territory under international control, or the United States' hypothetical military purchases in Ukraine. Everything must be studied and discussed, Aspin pointed out.

#### **Russian 'Expert' Debates Ukraine's 'Nuclear Legacy'**

*93UM0601A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 3 Jun 93 p 5*

[Article by Sergey Grigoryev, military expert, under the rubric "Disarmament": "What Is Ukraine to Do With the Nuclear Legacy From the USSR?"]

[Text]

#### **Cooperation Between the Military-Industrial Departments of the Two Nations Is Inevitable**

The mass media have recently discussed Ukraine's nuclear weapons extensively. The discussion is mainly a political one. The technical military aspects of the issue are practically not considered. Let us try to fill this gap.

Remember that there are no longer any tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Incidentally, the removal of the tactical nuclear warheads from former republics of the USSR, carried out without extra fanfare or incidents, will undoubtedly be regarded as a service by the military leadership of the USSR and Russia and of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

The strategic nuclear forces deployed in Ukraine consist of formations and units of the 43rd Missile Army and the 46th Air Army of the former Soviet Union. Two missile divisions of the 43rd Army have a total of 176 silo-based RS-18 and RS-22 intercontinental ballistic missiles (NATO refers to them as the SS-19 Stiletto and SS-24 Scalpel, respectively). The 46th Army has 43 various modifications of the Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95 (Bear) strategic bombers (including the Tu-95MS, which delivers cruise missiles). According to the Russian press these carriers are capable of delivering 1,880 nuclear payloads to targets. Ukraine is behind only Russia and the USA in numbers of strategic nuclear munitions. An assessment of the capability of a grouping of nuclear forces, however, requires more than just counting the number of delivery vehicles and the number of weapons on them. The methods used for this kind of assessment are complicated, but certain important elements can be pointed out.

#### **The Conformity of Existing Weapons to the Missions of the Armed Forces**

I would not be so bold as to define the directions and priorities of Ukraine's military strategy, but I would indicate that this state's main areas of interest and

potential enemies are in the Eastern Hemisphere. Obviously Ukraine cannot afford to compete with the United States either now or in the foreseeable future. In the light of this the effective strength of the Ukrainian nuclear forces is not the optimal, since the RS-18 and RS-22 missiles and the Tu-160 and Tu-95 bombers were created primarily for striking targets located in North America. The fact that they are not the optimal entails a number of problems in both the technical and the military areas. They include difficulty in destroying nearby targets, high maintenance costs, poor flexibility of employment and extensive requirements with respect to covering forces.

Ukraine's potential opponents can only be glad that the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was implemented before the breakup of the USSR. Otherwise, Ukraine would now have a powerful grouping of nuclear missiles corresponding to its geopolitical situation.

#### **Command and Control of Nuclear Forces**

We shall be using the term "command and control" here to mean a broad group of matters having to do with planning the combat employment of the weapons, assessing the situation, adopting the decision to employ the weapons, delivering the decision to the personnel and weapons, and ascertaining the results of the strike. The fact must be mentioned that the contribution of these factors to the results of warfare is constantly growing. Improving the command and control system and procedures sometimes has a greater effect than increasing the number of delivery vehicles or warheads. You will recall that lack of attention to command and control of troops and weapons resulted in the destruction of Iraq's air defenses in the very initial phase of the Persian Gulf War.

I have to say that the problems of command and control of Ukraine's nuclear forces cannot be resolved satisfactorily at the present time. The entire system of military agencies which select targets for the weapons and prepare the target designations is concentrated in Russia. The Ukrainian missiles are targeted either at nothing or at targets set for them in plans for the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR. An extremely great effort will be required for Ukraine to create its own system for planning nuclear strikes.

This is not merely a matter of monetary outlays. A relatively small number of skilled specialists working with highly classified information took part in the creation of these systems. Both the specialists and the information remained mainly in Russia. The technical means of command and control of the strategic weapons were originally designed to have maximum resistance to unskilled (or criminal) intervention. It is no accident that the possibility of blocking the employment of the nuclear weapons at a command from Russia presents a problem for Ukraine today.

The simple duplication of the expertise of others is unacceptable in designing ASUs [automatic systems of control and command] for nuclear weapons. The technical facilities and organizational procedures for such systems must include something known to no one except a small group of responsible individuals. Otherwise, there is no certainty that the nuclear forces will perform their mission when this is required and will not execute it at some other point in time. A fairly long time will pass before such Ukrainian "jewels" can be created and used. I would note that it would be fairly difficult to conceive of a quality system of command, control and target preparation without thorough testing.

#### **Technical Maintenance Problems**

Constant maintenance is required on the missile and aircraft systems and elements of the infrastructure in order to maintain them in a state of repair and battle-worthiness. Modern weapons are so complex that for a long time into the future only enterprises in the industry will be capable of this. The best results are achieved when technical oversight over the maintenance and repair is exercised by the actual designers and manufacturers of the weapons. One has to say that it would be very difficult for Ukraine to accomplish this on its own.

By a quirk of fate, in Ukraine, where all of the essential components for the nuclear weapons were produced (the missile itself, the command and control devices, sighting devices and the communication systems), there are no missile systems made up exclusively of Ukrainian components. It is also possible that we should speak not of a quirk of fate in this instance, but of foresight on the part of political and military leaders of the former USSR. I would point out that following the demarcation of the republics, Russia itself could have problems servicing the RS-16 and RS-20 missiles, as well as the sighting devices in many missile systems.

There is no question that Ukraine's technological capability would enable it to manufacture practically any components of strategic missiles, with the exception of the nuclear munitions. Major modifications of the weapons will require flight tests, however. And these would be impossible without the cooperation of Russia or Kazakhstan, because there are no missile ranges in Ukraine. The lack of testing facilities constitutes one of the most substantial barriers to the perfection of the Ukrainian nuclear weapons and the command and control systems for the strategic forces.

Much of what has been said applies also to the strategic bombers. Furthermore, unlike fixed-base modern missiles, aircraft require a lot of fuel and contain many components which must be regularly replaced or repaired (the engines, for example). A satisfactory solution to these problems will most likely not be found in the near future without Russia's participation.

**Safety Problems**

When the work of maintaining the weapons in a state of repair is performed poorly this will inevitably affect also operating safety. This problem is frequently exaggerated, but a 100-ton missile containing toxic fuel elements is indeed a thing of extra danger. We have read in the press about a serious incident involving an American Titan-2 missile (very similar to the RS-18, incidentally). The missile blew up when technical maintenance was being performed, resulting in human casualties, and it could have caused radioactive contamination of the area.

Another aspect of the safety problem is that of preventing the accidental or unauthorized launching of missiles, which, unlike the explosion in the silo, could result in a disaster for the entire planet. This complex subject warrants a separate discussion. I would comment only, that technical devices, organizational procedures and the personnel within the system of command and control of the nuclear systems, which Ukraine still has to create, will have to constitute the main barriers to a negligent individual or a saboteur.

**Military Problems**

Even a powerful grouping of nuclear missiles and bombers cannot execute a combat mission in modern warfare in isolation from other elements of the armed forces. Without interaction and without the resolution of matters of combat support, nuclear weapons are good only for soliciting funds for their destruction. It would seem that many problems of this nature in the Ukrainian armed forces are a long way from being solved at the present time. These problems include strategic reconnaissance, space communications, warning of a missile attack, PVO [air defense] and PRO [antimissile defense] for nuclear facilities, technical nuclear support and many others. Obviously, the independent resolution of these matters will take many years and involve very great expense.

Hopes of providing military security with a single component of the armed forces (even a very powerful one) are in vain. More than in any other field of human endeavor, success in military development is dependent upon a comprehensive, whole-system approach. The matter is complicated by the fact that potential enemies are not standing still. Influenced by technological progress, the nature of warfare is changing rapidly. Only constant improvement of the equipment can guarantee that the enemy's latest achievements will not make the available weapons obsolete, useless or even dangerous to the possessor. For those who are uncertain of their ability to take part in this arduous race it is cheaper to withdraw at the very beginning of the route, for, unfortunately, the end is not yet in sight.

**Summation**

A discussion of the technical military aspects of Ukrainian weapons brings up a number of questions. The sovereign right and difficult obligation to answer them lies with Ukraine.

1. From where does the danger to the state's security come?
2. What principles underlie the military policy?
3. Is it essential that the republic have nuclear weapons?
4. What kind of nuclear weapons does Ukraine need?
5. Should the nuclear legacy of the USSR be maintained in the Ukrainian armed forces?
6. Is Ukraine capable of maintaining the nuclear weapons in a state of battle-readiness?
7. Will the Ukrainian nuclear weapons not pose a greater danger in peacetime than in time of war?

There is no simple and obvious answer to any of these questions. It would be difficult just to enumerate all of the political, economic, military and sociopsychological factors which have to be considered in resolving this matter. The absence of real cooperation between the defense departments and military industry of Ukraine and Russia in this situation would appear unjustified.

**Belarus Grapples With Disarmament****PM Hosts British Diplomat**

WS2406130493 Minsk Radio Minsk Network  
in Belarusian 1200 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] On 23 June, Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich received British State Secretary Douglas Hogg who came to Minsk on a one-day visit. During the talks which were conducted in a businesslike and instructive atmosphere, the Belarusian minister discussed the current situation in the Republic, the structure of the Belarusian economy, and the difficulties on the way to national independence and market reforms of the economy. They also discussed the issue of disarmament. Kebich noted that Belarus is strictly following all the signed international agreements in this sphere. However, with regard to the dismantlement of arms foreseen by the strategic offensive weapons treaty, this process demands time and a large sum of money. This is a case in which the world community, including Great Britain, could render assistance to Belarus. Douglas Hogg, in his turn, confirmed that he views his visit to Belarus as the beginning of a new stage of business partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.

**Lack of Resources Decried**

WS2406131993 Minsk RID in Russian 1100 GMT  
24 Jun 93

[Report by RID correspondent Tatyana Shchebet: "Belarus Must Alone Convert Tanks into Sledges"]

[Text] In the nearest future, Belarus will need some \$33 million to terminate its military-strategic orders. According to Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr

Kravchanka, he has already asked the world community to create a fund for the support of the dismantlement of the main strategic arms that have been left on the Belarusian territory since the breakup of the USSR. The answer is likely to be received soon.

## SDI, SPACE ARMS, GLOBAL DEFENSE

### Russian Defense Ministry Launches 'SF-1' Space Probe

*LD2506131493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1055 GMT 25 Jun 93*

[By ITAR-TASS freelance correspondent Semen Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jun—At 1220 Moscow time the Space Military Forces [SMF] of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry launched a "Soyuz" carrier rocket with the "Resurs-F1" space probe. The space probe which was launched today is designed to study the Earth's natural resources. The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the SMF press center that this launch, to fulfill the specific purpose of a satellite of this series, passed off successfully.

The space probe has been placed in an orbit close to the calculated one. Flight control of "Resurs," as of any other space probe launched by Russia, is carried out by the SMF through the main center for the management and tests of space probes located in Golitsino-2 in Moscow oblast, with the assistance of a few individual space command, control, and telemetry complexes scattered throughout Russia from St. Petersburg to Maritime kray and Kamchatka.

Today's launch was a "jubilee" one, as this is the 60th time that a space probe of this class has been put into orbit, not counting the advertising and commercial "Resurs-500" satellite which was launched on 16 November 1992 under the "Europe-America-500" program. Moreover, the "Soyuz" carrier rocket has been launched 410 times from the northern cosmodrome. Altogether in the course of the space biography of Plesetsk there have been 1,430 launches of carrier rockets of various classes and 1,788 space probes were placed into near-Earth orbit.

### United States To Purchase Four Space Nuclear Reactors

*LD2706063393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0522 GMT 27 Jun 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Loshchilin]

[Text] Washington June 27 TASS—The United States intends to purchase another four Russian Topaz-2 space nuclear reactors in addition to the first two bought in May last year.

The value of the new deal, which has already been endorsed by the U.S. Departments of Defence and

Energy, is estimated at 20 million dollars, the well-informed SPACE newspaper reported.

The Topaz-2 is a unique power plant which has no analogues in the world and is capable of doubling the length of operation of up-to-date satellites and other spacecraft in orbit.

### Russian Rocket Sale to India Sparks Controversy

#### Chernomyrdin To Discuss Deal in U.S.

*LD1606153393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1242 GMT 16 Jun 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Podyapolskiy]

[Text] Moscow June 16 TASS—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin will visit the United States on June 27-29 to discuss the Russian-Indian space deal opposed by the US Administration, according to Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin.

He told a press conference on Wednesday that the visit is "preconditioned" by the US commitment to refrain from imposing sanctions against Russian space agencies before and two months after the visit in retaliation for what the United States believes is a violation of the missile technology non-proliferation regime. Shokhin said that Russia insists on an international examination of its contract with India on shipment of a cryogenic rocket engine.

"We would like to solve this mostly political problem by a civilised way. We are not going to use the language of ultimatums and violate bilateral agreements with India", he added.

Shokhin also said that the compensation offered by the United States for breaking the deal does not suit Russia as it fails to provide guarantees of a refund of 400 million US dollars of estimated losses.

#### Foreign Minister Kozyrev on Deal

*LD2306161593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1540 GMT 23 Jun 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS—Russia and the United States are obliged to reach an acceptable solution to the dispute over Russian shipments of cryogenic rocket engines to India, according to Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev who said the problem is of a technical character.

Russian experts view the shipments differently than US colleagues who believe the deal to be a violation of the non-proliferation regime for missile technologies, Kozyrev told heads of Russian mass media on Wednesday.

He stressed that Russia is even more interested in observing the regime, as well as nuclear non-proliferation than the United States as all countries which are potential producers of the weapons are situated around Russia and the CIS states.

"In this case it is a technical dispute: Whether the deal is within or outside the limits of existing agreements", Kozyrev said.

Space cooperation with the United States is a "priority Russian interest" and development of relations in the sphere can serve as an example of political partnership, the minister said, adding that intensive consultations are being held with the United States on the Indian space deal at present.

The search for a solution is going on "in a benevolent way", he stressed.

#### Russian Minister Cancels U.S. Visit

*BK2506031293 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0245 GMT 25 Jun 93*

[Text] The Russian prime minister, Mr. Viktor Chernomyrdin, has canceled his visit to Washington scheduled for next week. Reports say the cancellation is due to the differences over the sale of cryogenic rocket engines to India and the transfer of technology for their production. However, according to Russian news agency the decision is due to unresolved economic issues. The Prime Minister's Office in Moscow said the visit has been rescheduled for a later date. Meanwhile, Russian Television has called as baseless the U.S. claim that the technology could be used by India to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles.

#### U.S. Urged to 'Compromise'

*PM2906082393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jun 93 First Edition p 4*

[Boris Konovalov article: "End of 'Cold War' Has Not Paved Russia's Way to Space Services Market"]

[Text] An advance group headed by Vice Premier A. Shokhin flew out to the United States ahead of Russian Head of Government V. Chernomyrdin's [planned] visit there. One of the group's tasks is to discuss questions concerning Russia's admission to the world market in commercial launches. The situation is very difficult.

So far all mechanisms have been set in train to prevent Russia from entering this market, which has already been operating for over 15 years. At the same time it is clear that, given the ending of the Cold War, a major space power's claims to the right to make commercial launches cannot be discounted. But even without Russia this market is crowded. The Europeans have a 60-65-percent share and the Americans a 30-percent share. They have to jockey for position, since the supply of launch services is 2.5 times greater than consumer demand even without Russia.

The United States has control of a powerful lever for regulating this market. Over 60 percent of payloads, including those for Asian, African, and Latin America countries, are carried by U.S. firms. For a communications satellite to land in Russia or Kazakhstan, for instance, under currently existing laws a U.S. export license must be obtained. This problem cannot be solved without political agreement. To date we have signed our one and only contract, for the launch of the INMARSAT-3 international satellite, only last year. And this happened only after a joint political statement by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin supporting this project.

But the United States has now taken a very hard-line stance, linking Russia's admission to the space services market to its joining the agreement on the nonproliferation of rocket technology. The "acid test" was the contract signed by the USSR Glavkosmos [Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research] and the Indian Space Research Organization on cooperation in constructing a cryogenic hydrogen stage for India's national launcher.

Indeed, formally the agreement on the nonproliferation of rocket technology, to which Russia still does not belong, draws no distinction between peaceful rocket boosters for space vehicles and live missiles. The sole criterion is that everything belonging to the category of rockets capable of carrying a load of over 500 kg for a distance of over 300 km is considered dangerous. The United States views the Indian contract from this perspective. And, while not objecting now to the delivery of materiel, the United States views the transfer of technological documentation and some equipment and rigging as a potentially dangerous situation. The Americans claim that with some modernization all this could be used to produce live missiles.

Specialists realize that it is in fact practically inconceivable to use cryogenic stages with very complex fuel technology for military purposes. Nevertheless, relying on purely formal indications, the United States is already applying sanctions to Glavkosmos and is threatening to extend them to a number of Russian space enterprises. All contacts between the United States and Indian space organizations, which before that were extremely comprehensive and benevolent, have been banned for two years now.

Russia is having to combat this hard-line approach in very difficult economic conditions. In a conversation with me Yu. Koptev, general director of the Russian Space Agency, said that many space sector enterprises are now on the verge of closure. In the first quarter of this year the average wage in the space sector was only 13,000 rubles [R] a month. At the same time the average in the machine building sector was much higher—R21,000. The government's latest decision to cut budget sectors' appropriations by 20 percent will greatly affect the rocket and space industry.

"In these conditions," Yuriy Nikolayevich says, "we are very interested in all sources of nonbudgetary appropriations." The stakes are now on wide-ranging cooperation with Europe and the United States. Documents on granting Russia 12 commercial rocket launches in the period from 1996 through 2000 have been prepared with the EC. The Russian Space Agency and NASA have agreed on possible areas for utilizing our technologies and production capacities for a version of the future "Freedom" station. The utilization of Soyuz ships as rescue ships could become a reality. With the aid of Russian rockets individual elements of the Freedom station could be put into orbit and our docking, temperature regulation, and life-support systems could be utilized. A more extensive project to construct a joint station is being discussed. This cooperation could bring our space sector a minimum of \$500-600 million, while the maximum estimates are in excess of \$1.5 billion...

Yes, of course, such cooperation would substantially ease the burden of the economic crisis for our Russian space enterprises. Compared with this, the benefits of space cooperation with India look much more modest. The currently existing space contract with India is worth \$120 million. True, it could be followed by a second contract for the creating the entire infrastructure and backup for launching cryogenic stages. This will total around \$300 million.

But a comparison of the benefits of cooperation between the United States and India must not be approached purely from the viewpoint of simple arithmetic. India is our long-standing partner in the scientific and technical and military spheres. Breaking the space contract will hit this partnership badly. Furthermore, to a certain extent India is a Third World leader and its voice is heeded here. Breaking the contract will undoubtedly be viewed as weakness on Russia's part, as yielding to pressure from the imperialist superpower. We will get a name as an unreliable, unpredictable partner too dependent on U.S. "favor." This will undermine Russia's position in all world markets—which it cannot afford.

The only way out of the situation that has arisen is to seek a compromise, to hold trilateral talks, with India's participation essential. Firm guarantees from that country's leadership that everything obtained from the Russian-Indian contract will be used only for peaceful space purposes could serve as the basis of a compromise.

#### **Mir Space Station Will Work Three-Four Years More**

LD2106131893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1300 GMT 21 Jun 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova]

[Text] Moscow June 21 TASS—The Russian "Mir" station, which is staying in orbit for the eighth year, will work in space until 1996-1997 and experts are designing

a new generation space platform, according to Valeriy Alaverdov, first deputy director general of the Russian Space Agency.

The new station will be equipped with a wide range of instruments for practical experiments and fundamental research, he told TASS on Monday.

Alaverdov said the "Mir" will be used in space research cooperation with the United States. A US astronaut is expected to fly on it in 1994.

Talks are being held on the use of Russian know-how in maintaining space stations in the creation of the US "Freedom" platform, he added.

In future an international space station is to be created where researchers from dozens of countries will work, according to Alaverdov.

#### **Space Industry's Commercial Prospects Viewed**

PM1606120793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian 15 Jun 93 p 7

[Vladimir Naumov report: "Protons Needed To Go Into Space"]

[Text] Russia is fully determined to occupy the position that befits a leading space power in the world commercial satellite launch market. Will it succeed?

The rapid development of satellite television and communications and navigation systems has necessitated a considerable number of satellites. It is clear that not every country can independently place these in near-earth orbit. Demand has generated supply, and a new type of market service has emerged in the world—launching commercial satellites. The space powers are offering their launchers for this purpose.

This market is very profitable. For example, Brazil paid the U.S. Orbital Science Corporation \$13.5 million to place a relatively small data communications satellite in orbit. However, the cost of launching the most popular heavy space devices into geostationary orbit runs into tens of millions of dollars. It is therefore not surprising that the United States, France, Japan, and China—the countries with developed space technologies—are participating in this market. Sad as it may seem, only Russia has failed to find a niche in this market—the power which, as a diagram from the U.S. gazette SPACE NEWS shows, annually launches... twice as many spacecraft as the United States.

So what is going on? Perhaps we ourselves did not want to earn any money from our space programs? Not at all. Russia has frequently offered its services. But the market has already been divided up. And it is blatantly obvious that the emergence of a new participant in it will force the rest to squeeze up. The "old timers" have therefore brought various subterfuges into play with a view to maintaining their position.

The United States, for example, has adopted a special law banning any firm, regardless of its national affiliation, to import onto CIS territory any spacecraft produced in the United States or containing components manufactured using U.S. technology. It has to be said that every Western satellite contains dozens of these components. Thus any state intending to use Russian services is forbidden from importing the satellite into our country to be launched from our space centers. And up to now nobody has risked accepting the extremely attractive offers made by the Russians.

There used to be ideological motives as well: The West was supposed to have nothing to do with the Russian space industry because Russia was a state with a non-market economic structure, U.S. economic strategists used to say, and therefore it could not participate in a market. However, we ourselves have at times poured fuel on the fire through our sales of nonferrous and ferrous metals and weapons—Russians mean dumping and the end not just of superprofits but also of normal economic relations!

Meanwhile nobody needs reminding how much Russia needs to extend its trade: Only thus, given the shortage of money available for its space programs, can it preserve the position it has achieved and move forward. The government and specialists from the Russian space agency are therefore endeavoring to participate in commercial launches on an equal footing with other powers.

Talks were held the other day in Moscow between representatives of the Russian and U.S. ministries concerned. It has been decided that with effect from 1996 and for five years after that Russia will be allocated a commercial launch quota of nine foreign satellites into geostationary orbit and three into low orbits. Despite the fact that this constitutes 10-15 percent of the total number of launches, the quota fully measures up to the technical resources of the Baykonur and Plesetsk space centers and does not encroach on Russia's national dignity. Taking our own requirements into account, at the present time we can only set aside two or three launchpads per year.

It is intended that, together with the other space powers, in two years' time Russia will take part in tendering for the right to carry out launches of commercial payloads. At the same time, specialists believe, our rockets stand a very good chance of winning a tender. In their opinion, buyers will be attracted first and foremost by the advanced level of Russian technology: Our Protons are two or three times more reliable than the U.S. Titans and Atlases and the European Arianes. Another important advantage is launch costs which, despite the U.S. side's antidumping demands, turn out to be lower than the price offered by the United States, France, or Japan.

One would think that the deal had been struck and Russian rockets will be launched right away for dollars. However, the Americans have introduced a fly into the ointment: The U.S. delegation did not fail to link the

implementation of this agreement with another demand—that Russia should comply rigorously with a regime banning the export of rocket technology to third countries and monitor its proliferation.

So it is still too early to talk about full mutual understanding between the two superpowers on this ticklish issue. But there is still time before 1996. Thus there is still hope that the differences will be overcome and Russia will occupy its proper place on the commercial services market. Or will the Russian space industry have to remain, as was the case before, a heavy millstone around the state's neck?

### Russian Satellites Launched

#### Plesetsk Cosmodrome Busy

*LD2406083493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0805 GMT 24 Jun 93*

[Report by ITAR-TASS freelance correspondent Semen Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Jun—At 0812 hours Moscow time [0412 GMT] today, from the Plesetsk cosmodrome, by means of one Tsiklon rocket, the launching of six artificial Earth satellites was effected: Cosmos-2252, Cosmos-2253, Cosmos-2254, Cosmos-2255, Cosmos-2256, and Cosmos-2257. The launch was carried out in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the press center of the Military Space Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense that the movement of the six space apparatuses was proceeding along orbits close to those calculated. Guidance of the satellites was being effected by the chief center for the control and testing of space apparatuses, located in the town of Golitsino-2 near Moscow and structurally forming part of the Military Space Forces.

The launch of the Tsiklon carrier rocket took place within the framework of the practical implementation at Plesetsk cosmodrome of the Ekos program, devised by the military jointly with industry. Under the program, from 13 July 1992, all launches of carrier rockets of this type are being carried out with 30 percent reduced residue of the components of the rocket fuel in the tanks of the first stage, which effects an increased degree of ecological cleanliness of the space rocketry.

#### Kosmos-2251 Satellite Launched

*LD1606162593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1545 GMT 16 Jun 93*

[Text] Moscow, 16 Jun (ITAR-TASS)—An artificial earth satellite Kosmos-2251 was launched on 16 June from the Plesetsk cosmodrome by a Kosmos carrier rocket.

The satellite carries scientific apparatus for continuing space research.

The satellite has been placed in orbit with the following parameters: initial period of revolution, 100.8 minutes; apogee, 821 km; perigee, 783 km; orbital inclination, 74 degrees.

Besides scientific apparatus, the satellite carries a radio system for the precise measurement of orbital elements and a radiotelemetry system for transmitting to Earth data about the work of the instruments and scientific apparatus.

The apparatus aboard the satellite is working normally.

The coordinating and computing center is processing the incoming information.

### Russia Competes in Satellite Launch Industry

PM1606114093 Paris *LE MONDE* in French 15 Jun 93  
p23

[Jean-Paul Dufour article: "The Irresistible Rise of the Russian Rockets"]

[Text] The Russians arrived en masse at Le Bourget making no secret of the fact they have come here "to sell." And it will surely be no coincidence at all if the opening of the Air Show coincides with the official announcement of the conclusion of the discussions which would allow them to gain substantial access to the Western satellite launching market. Two bilateral accords negotiated with the United States and Europe respectively are due to be signed in the next few weeks. These accords, which fix tariffs and quotas for the Russians regarding the placing of Western satellites into orbit, mark the end of a round of brisk bargaining against the background of the trade war between America and Europe.

The story dates back to 9 November 1992 when the international telecommunications organization Inmarsat signed a contract for one of its satellites to be put into space by a Russian Proton launcher. This is a "first" for Moscow, which had been trying unsuccessfully for several years to gain access to the Western market by offering the services of this tried and tested launcher at rock-bottom prices. Until then the U.S. Government used to systematically counter those efforts by invoking COCOM rules to prevent the satellites (which always contain at least one piece of American "sensitive technology") from appearing on launch pads in the East. This time Washington gave the go-ahead, much to the displeasure of the Europeans, who see this as a devious maneuver to destabilize the Ariane project, which holds a 50 percent share of the civilian market in the face of competition from its American rivals Delta, Atlas, and Titan.

The concern of Arianespace is well founded: Inmarsat is paying \$36 million import duty for Proton whereas the bill for the same service from Ariane is \$62 million, a price which the Western launchers can scarcely go below without losing money. Rushing in to plug the gap, the

U.S. firm Motorola Satellite Communications announced in February its intention to use Proton to launch (in three batches) 21 of the 70 small satellites for Iridium, its future world mobile telephone system. And finally, the U.S. firm Lockheed is signing with Khrunichev, the manufacturer of Proton, an agreement for the future sale of the Russian launcher in the United States.

In Washington's defense it should be recognized that the fall of the Berlin wall and the Russian desire to acquire a market economy made the status quo hard to justify. There had to be negotiations aimed at "damage limitation" by persuading Moscow to operate tariffs more in line with market prices. "The U.S. license for the Inmarsat contract was linked to the opening of negotiations in this sphere. President Bush and President Yeltsin reached agreement on this point during their last summit," Aleksandr Medvedchikov, assistant general director for international cooperation at the Russian Space Agency, noted.

Anxious not to offend anyone's feelings, Yuriy Koptev, general director of the Russian Space Agency, has proposed multilateral negotiations involving Russia, the United States, and Europe. This will not be followed up. On both sides of the Atlantic they are asserting that it is the "other" side which is keen to go it alone. "The European and U.S. sides have expressed the desire to begin by negotiating bilaterally," Mr. Medvedchikov explained with a smile. It could hardly be otherwise. Since 1985 in fact the discussions between Europe and the United States aimed at defining the "rules of good conduct" regarding space launches have been like a dialogue of the deaf. Given that Washington accuses Europe of subsidizing Arianespace, the latter regards the opening up of the U.S. federal procurement market as a precondition.

This time matters have been dealt with efficiently. The sealing of the Russian-American accord (which is to be signed before the end of June) was announced a month ago to the U.S. Congress Science, Space, and Technology Committee. The accord specifies that the services of Russia's Proton launcher cannot be offered at less than 7.5 percent below the lowest Western bid.

Telecommunications satellites, which form the vast bulk of the market, are placed in geostationary orbit, and here the Russians are given a quota of eight launches before 31 December 2000 with a maximum of two launches a year. Even if you add to that the launch of the Inmarsat satellite, this represents at least 6 percent of the market (Footnote) (In 1992 Ariane launched 11 civilian satellites: Atlas, United States, three launches, one unsuccessful; Delta, United States, five; Titan, United States, one; the U.S. shuttle, two; the Japanese H1 rocket, one; the Chinese launcher Long March, two, one unsuccessful). The launch of satellites into other orbits (like Motorola's Iridium satellites) will be examined case by case.

For his part, [EC Commissioner] Leon Brittan announced 7 June in Moscow that the European Commission and the European Space Agency [ESA] had also reached an accord. This accord is "still to be ratified by the Russian side," the European commissioner responsible for foreign economic policy explained. According to ESA Director General Jean-Marie Luton, "there are no great differences" between this accord and the U.S. one. "We did not just think in terms of defending the interests of Western Europe but also in terms of promoting partnership with Russia," Mr. Luton stressed.

Is this the end of the battle? That is not certain. "At the present moment Ariane is dominant in the sphere of geostationary orbit: Its only rival here is the Russian Proton rocket," Mr. Medvedchikov recently told industrialists in Paris. "But our very varied fleet of launchers lends itself well to other uses too." In the past the USSR had tried, also in vain, to put the Zenit, another of its rockets, on the commercial market. MZ Progress, the consortium which makes this launcher, is now Ukrainian. Its director general, Mr. Kozlov, confirmed this week in Paris that he also wants to get into the Western market and added: "It is insulting to limit us to such ridiculous quotas."

Thus new developments can be expected. Especially since a 7.5 percent discount is probably not enough to persuade clients to risk a launch in the East, which will additionally require their satellite, designed for Western launchers, to be adapted. The Russians will thus be tempted to continue their dumping practices. They have the means to do so in the short term at least: At the present rate of the ruble a Proton would be 100 times cheaper than a Western launcher!

According to Charles Bigot, managing director of ArianeSpace, mutual good will should prevail nevertheless: "The Russians," he said, "are aware that a market as narrow and fragile as this should not be unsettled unduly." And for a long while to come they will remain dependent on Western aid to safeguard their space industry.

## CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

### Lithuania Grapples With Russian Troop Withdrawal

#### **President Said To Be Collaborating**

WS1806141193 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN  
in English 1430 GMT 17 Jun 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 268]

[Text] A Constitutional Security Commission released a statement yesterday reading that public statements made by the Lithuanian President and by the National Defence Minister concerning plans to collaborate with the Russian Army are the signs of attempts to incorporate Lithuania in a post—Soviet military union. "The

Lithuanian officials have stated openly their intentions to manage together with Russia its military enterprises on Lithuania's territory and to send Lithuanian specialists in airborne landing and in Navy Fleet for training to Russia, as well as to form Lithuanian armament in line with the Russian one", it has been remarked on the statement. According to the authors of the statement, activities of this sort would violate the Lithuanian Constitution and the constitutional act on "Lithuania's position to stay away from post—soviet eastern unions". The Constitutional Security Commission was established in April upon the initiative of Lithuanian Citizen Charter. Its principle objectives are to defend the Lithuanian constitution as the guarantee of statehood, democracy and citizenship, and to observe that the government's actions and nominal acts do not contradict the main law of the state. The commission is headed by Antanas Buracas, a professional economist and scholar.

#### **Talks Have 'Slowed to Crawl'**

WS2106143493 Tallinn BNS in English 1128 GMT  
21 Jun 93

[Text] Vilnius, June 21, BNS—Lithuanian and Russian negotiators slowed to a crawl in their talks on an agreement to transport Russian troops through Lithuania.

The protocol, which would allow Russia to withdraw its troops in Germany through Lithuania, has become mired in questions of payments and transportation, said one official.

In an interview with the *Lietuvos rytas*, the leader of the Lithuanian delegation Katuoka, said that the basic agreement had been coordinated. But only 15 payment provisions of the 37 have been approved. Nor is there any agreement on the procedure for settling mutual accounts, he said.

Although Russia wants Lithuania to pay for Russian goods and services in hard currency, it insists that it pay its transit fees in rubles. Lithuania cannot accept such a proposal, say negotiators.

### **Latvia Claims Russia 'Practically' Halts Armed Forces Withdrawal**

WS2106121193 Tallinn BNS in English 1630 GMT  
19 Jun 93

[Text] Riga, June 19, BNS - Russia practically has halted the withdrawal of its armed force units and turnover of military installations to Latvia, the head of the Latvian bureau for monitoring the withdrawal, Ilgonis Upmalis, told the *Diena* newspaper.

According to information at the disposal of the bureau, Russia's respective decision is based on a 10 [date as received] statement by President Boris Yeltsin, which he made at a meeting of the command of Russia's armed forces.

Upmalis declined to elaborate.

Yeltsin in the statement mentioned the unpreparedness of necessary housing facilities in Russia and what he called continuing human rights violations in Estonia and Latvia as reasons making it necessary to suspend the withdrawal.

Russian leaders and army leadership also on different occasions earlier have announced suspending the pullout, but the process then actually wasn't halted.

### Moldova Demands 'Complete' Withdrawal of Russian Troops

AU1706161693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English  
0821 GMT 17 Jun 93

[Text] Chisinau, ROMPRES, 17/6/1993—In connection with the speech made by Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, at the meeting of the executive of Russia's Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Moldova has issued a statement reiterating the stand of the Chisinau officials regarding the undelayed, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the foreign armed forces from Moldova's territory, consistent with the documents of the CSCE and other international organizations. The idea launched by President Boris Yeltsin regarding the possibility of creating Russian military bases in the territories of some former Soviet republics, the statement reads, is unacceptable, in any form, for the Republic of Moldova. But it welcomes the second variant advanced by Boris Yeltsin, regarding the presence of the Russian military forces abroad: "the withdrawal of the Russian Armies from all countries" that were formerly components of the defunct USSR. It is an opportune and realistic proposal, serving both the interests of the Republic of Moldova and of the Russian Federation, the statement reads. In this respect, the signing in a near future of a Moldovan-Russian agreement on the undelayed and unconditional withdrawal of the Russian military forces from Moldova's territory will help not only the political settlement of the conflict in Moldova's eastern districts but also the further development of the good relations between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, reads the statement quoted by MOLDOVA PRES.

### Belarus Official Laments West's Disarmament Response

MK2306111693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 23 Jun 93 p 3

[Igor Sinyakevich report under "Belarus" rubric: "Free Disarmament Is a Bad Example. Belarus Has Not Received a Cent for Its Voluntary Abandonment of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Valeriy Tsipkalo, adviser to the chairman of the Belarus Supreme Soviet, recalled in an interview with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that Belarus had voluntarily, without any preliminary conditions, given up any claims over the nuclear bases of the former USSR

located on its territory. In February the Belarus parliament ratified the START I Treaty and passed a decision to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state. Belarus ceded the nuclear facilities on its territory under Russia's jurisdiction and came out with the initiative to create a nuclear-free belt from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

According to Tsipkalo, however, Belarus' disarmament initiatives are not meeting with a correct understanding among the nuclear powers' leadership. "Belarus has not received a cent for its voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons," Stanislav Shushkevich's adviser said. According to Tsipkalo, prospects of getting aid from the United States under the Nunn-Lugar act appear more than bleak. Delegations arriving in Minsk for talks on allocating funds for nuclear disarmament usually represent different departments. The representatives of newly arriving delegations state that they have no idea about the preceding rounds of Belarus-U.S. talks on this issue.

According to Tsipkalo, the Western countries' indifference to the problem of nuclear disarmament in Belarus is affecting the position of Ukraine. Thus, at a recent international conference, "European Integration and Military-Political Aspects of Collective Security," a representative of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry addressed Mechislav Grib, representative of the Belarus parliamentary commission on defense, with the question: "Has Belarus received any assistance following its abandonment of nuclear weapons?" Grib had to say no. According to Tsipkalo, this question is the quintessence of Ukraine's position.

Shushkevich's adviser expressed the opinion that the breakdown of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would change the whole notion of collective security. Many countries would start associating their concept of national security with the presence of nuclear weapons. For instance, North Korea could acquire nuclear weapons, and its move would cause South Korea to respond in kind. Following the elimination of the nonproliferation treaty there would be more arguments in favor of Taiwan's nuclear projects. The Arab countries would also follow this path. Therefore a "domino effect" would be provoked. According to Tsipkalo, this issue is all the more acute in view of the pending resumption of the treaty in 1995.

Shushkevich's adviser also touched on the problem of conventional armaments. In his opinion, following the reduction of armaments under the CFE Treaty, Belarus is spending 1.6 times more than the United States, France, and Britain put together. "Belarus is still observing all the obligations it has assumed, in spite of the tremendous spending on Chernobyl programs," Tsipkalo said. "But in view of the complicated socioeconomic situation, the government might be forced to redistribute budgetary resources from disarmament to social programs." "The impression is that Europe is not at all concerned about the security situation and the

presence of nuclear weapons in the region," the Supreme Soviet chairman's adviser noted.

### Lithuania Asks U.S. To Monitor Russian Army Withdrawal

WS2306103993 *Tallinn BNS* in English 2004 GMT  
22 Jun 93

[Text] Vilnius, Jun 22, BNS—Premier Adolfas Slezevicius applied to U.S. authorities for observers to monitor for the Russian army pullout.

Slezevicius told Anthony Lake, the U.S. National security advisor, that Russian troop withdrawal was nearing an end and stressed the need to establish international control over the process.

The appeal marks the first step by the present Lithuanian authorities to invite international observers for the troop withdrawal.

The American advisor on national security promised to consider the question, according to the Lithuanian service of the Voice of America.

At his meeting with Lake, Slezevicius also tried to clear a space for Lithuanian firms to participate in the U.S.-financed competition for building of flats for Russian soldiers returning to their country.

The Lithuanian prime minister also met today with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and representatives of the International Monetary Fund.

Slezevicius negotiated Monday [21 June] with the leaders of the Import-Export Bank and the World Bank.

Slezevicius returns to Vilnius after his meetings with the U.S. Ministry of Agriculture and the U.S. Treasury Wednesday.

## CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

### Chemical Weapons Destruction Plant Shown on TV

LD2006172993 *Moscow Russian Television Network* in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Jun 93

[Video report by correspondent S. Zhdanova from Samara, identified by caption; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Facility 12-12 in the year 1989 cost the treasury 55 million rubles. It is a unique works for the destruction of chemical weapons. Its high degree of safety and the ecological soundness of its technology have been confirmed by U.S. and German experts and three independent expert studies.

Before it could start work it was closed under the influence of the public of Chapayevsk, near where it was

built. But it did not start work as a study and training center either. For 4 years the officers have been carefully keeping the locks and seals.

And all this time the public has not been dozing—quite literally. At night deputies can come and find out if any work is being done in secret. A tired military men will patiently explain that the facilities are working. [Video shows unidentified man saying work only going on in maintenance room, model of the plant, exterior of plant showing pipelines and tanks among green grass, man apparently mowing or raking, interior of plant]

### Russian Chemical Troops Have New Defensive Doctrine

LD2306203193 *Moscow Russian Television Network* in Russian 1900 GMT 23 Jun 93

[from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A training course has been held at the Shikhany range near Saratov for command personnel of the Russian chemical, radiation, and biological protection troops. This new name for the chemical troops and the demonstration of the latest equipment in this area confirmed that chemical troops now have a new defensive doctrine: instead of producing chemical weapons, technological processes are worked out to destroy such weapons; instead of working on poisonous substances, research is underway with potentially colossal profits for the national economy.

The fate of chemical weapons stored at military storage facilities on the oblast territory, remains a most serious problem, both for the chemical troops and leaders of Saratov Oblast, who were invited to attend as guests. A decision to eliminate such weapons has been made at the political olympus, but the mechanism itself of this process has still not been defined. [Video shows various weapons in action]

## WEAPONS CONVERSION

### Chelyabinsk Nuclear Factory Diversifies Into Motors

LD2106081393 *Moscow Radio Rossii Network* in Russian 0700 GMT 21 Jun 93

[Text] Celebrations marking the 45th anniversary of the Mayak chemicals factory, the country's first nuclear industrial installation, have ended in Chelyabinsk-65.

Mayak director Viktor Fetisov told ITAR-TASS that the factory remains in the defense sector, but it did begin a thorough conversion program a few years ago which, as everywhere else in the defense sector, is proceeding with difficulty. However, production of isotopes is expanding and the product is in demand in several countries. A factory is being built to produce electric motors for household appliances and construction tools.

**Plan To Convert Weapons For Ecological Study Purposes**

*PM2406104793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
22 Jun 93 First Edition p 15 (page dated 19 Jun)*

[Boris Konovalov report: "Guns Will Fire at the Sky To Protect the Planet's Ozone Layer"]

[Text] The depletion of the ozone layer around our planet is causing specialists serious concern. Because of this, the intensity of ultraviolet radiation on the earth's surface is 50-100 percent higher in Australia than in Germany, which is located in the same latitude in the northern hemisphere. Doctors are linking this with the increase in skin cancer in Australia.

A similar situation has been observed in southern regions of Chile and Argentina. It has been established that the decrease in ozone concentrations in the stratosphere is increasing the number of cataracts. The UN Environmental Program notes that a 1-percent thinning of the ozone layer will mean an additional 100,000 people go blind. Succeeding generations will suffer a bigger impact since they will be subjected to increased ultraviolet radiation for a longer period of their life. The development of many types of plant on earth could be halted, and grain crop harvests will fall. There is a danger to forests and the biological environment of the world's oceans.

Therefore, together with a strengthening of bans on the use of chlorofluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons, which are destroying the ozone layer, the world community is beginning to discuss projects for restoring it. It has been suggested that aircraft could be fitted with ozone generators that would then pump ozone into the atmosphere. The idea of launching oxygen into the stratosphere, which would then turn into ozone under the influence of solar radiation, has also been mooted. But the "exhaust gases" produced by aircraft and rockets are themselves dangerous for the ozone layer.

The conversion currently under way in Russia provides an opportunity to use an environmentally clean ballistic method of protecting the ozone layer. Our country has developed very large guns with a caliber of 300 mm which are already capable of delivering heavy projectiles to an altitude of 50 km. In the longer term it may be possible to fire projectiles up to an altitude of 100 km with the aid of totally environmentally clean launchers that use an electromagnetic method of accelerating the projectiles, for example.

Specialists from the "Burevestnik" Central Scientific Research Institute in Nizhniy Novgorod and the Central Aerological Observatory are proposing to use versions of existing guns to develop ballistic launchers capable of launching about 100 kg of reagents into the ozone layer on every shot. Since the mass of ozone lost over Antarctica is about 2 million tonnes per year, it is clear that impressive batteries of launchers are required. No state on its own can afford this expenditure—the idea can

only be implemented by the financial efforts of the whole of mankind. Russia's technical resources are ready to develop it today.

Without putting things off until tomorrow, the ballistic method can be used right now to perform detailed studies of the influence of various substances on the condition of the ozone layer.

Certain scientists are currently expressing the "seditious idea" that mankind's impact on the ozone layer is significantly less than that of nature. It must be noted that regular global observations of the condition of the ozone layer only began at the end of the 1970's with the appearance of appropriate devices aboard satellites. At the present time the amount of statistical data is not large.

Ye. Zhadin, senior scientific associate at the Central Aerological Observatory, who specializes in researching the ozone layer, believes that its condition is susceptible to long-term fluctuations connected with climatic conditions. In his opinion, the primary cause of anomalies in the ozone layer is long-term change in the temperature of the world's oceans. Therefore in some years there is a particular vortex around Antarctica that prevents ozone penetrating from the mean latitudes. This results in the appearance of a considerable ozone hole over Antarctica. If this hypothesis is true, banning freons will not solve the problem.

No less important is the significance the ballistic method will have for deciding the future of stratospheric aviation. Right now the EC, the United States, and Japan are showing enormous interest in developing supersonic passenger aircraft. But these flights are supposed to take place at a height of 20-25 km, in the band where the ozone layer is at its most concentrated. It is clear that careful research is needed into the dangers of such flights.

The ballistic method is a cheap way of simulating the exhaust stream of aircraft engines and really studying how they affect ozone.

The Russian Federation Ministry of Science and Technology Policy has supported the proposal by the "Burevestnik" Central Scientific Research Institute and the Central Aerological Observatory to develop the ballistic method of studying and restoring the ozone layer. If the project becomes international, this will sharply accelerate the time frame for its implementation. Guns developed in Russia for antimissile defense can be used successfully for peaceful scientific purposes.

**NUCLEAR TESTING**

**Russian Leaders Seek Extension of Testing Moratorium**

**Gorbachev Sends Message to Washington**

*LD1906204593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
22 Jun 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[Text] Geneva June 19 TASS—Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev opened here an office of the international non-government "Green Cross" environmental organisation on Saturday by announcing his appeal to US President Bill Clinton to refrain from resuming nuclear tests.

Gorbachev, who is the chairman of the new organisation, said he had forwarded a corresponding message to the US President on June 9 warning him that the resumption of nuclear tests may affect Ukrainian ratification of the START-1 Treaty.

He also said that in case Russia resumes tests on the only remaining range at the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago the radiation may spread outside the borders of the country. Such an incident may be detrimental to Russian economic reforms, according to Gorbachev.

He also announced another initiative of the organisation saying it plans to offer to governments to carry out "an inventory" of all objects posing nuclear and radioactive danger which would allow to avoid possible catastrophes.

Gorbachev said the "Green Cross" is not going to compete with other environmental organisations, but will cooperate with them and carry out joint initiatives aimed at preserving the environment. The organisation wants to become an "open forum" for discussions of burning ecological problems, he added.

The "Green Cross" has already opened an office in The Hague in May which will engage in research and distribute information, while the Geneva mission will work to avert ecological catastrophes.

The idea of creating such an organisation won support of the UN Conference on Environment and development held in Rio de Janeiro last June.

#### Radio Broadcast Advocates Ban

LD2206200593 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 22 Jun 93

[Text] Will all nuclear testing stop? Here's an opinion from Yuriy Solton:

This would seem to be the time to ban all nuclear tests. The threat of a nuclear conflict is practically non-existent; the race for nuclear weapons has ended; Russia and the United States are making deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals; and France and Britain have limited the production of nuclear weapons.

To resume tests at such a time would be absurd, dangerously absurd. So far the five members of the nuclear club are refraining from testing. But will this be for long? Much will depend on what the administration in Washington decides before 1 July, when America's nine-month moratorium on nuclear tests expires.

Judging by reports from Washington, President Clinton is under strong pressure from the Pentagon and nuclear

laboratories, which are suggesting various limited programs to break the resistance of the many members of Congress who want the moratorium extended.

Under one program, nine tests would be staged at the Nevada site before 1996—six to verify the reliability of American weapons, and three to modify British weapons. It is also suggested to reach an agreement to lower the power of underground nuclear explosions to one kiloton.

Any country that on any pretext resumes nuclear testing will be assuming grave responsibility for a dangerous chain reaction.

Russia has not staged nuclear explosions for the past two and a half years, but it could well reconsider its position. More than that, as THE NEW YORK TIMES has pointed out, resumption of nuclear tests in the present climate could only set a bad example for potential members of the nuclear club. Such a move would also make it difficult to extend the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, expiring the year after next.

Every nuclear power declares its ultimate goal is a ban on all nuclear explosions, but this is seen as something in the long term. Yet all conditions to bring this closer to the present are already at hand. An important move in this direction would be for all the nuclear powers to extend the moratorium.

#### Foreign Minister Says Same

LD2306161193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1525 GMT 23 Jun 93

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow June 23 TASS—Russia "will be the last to resume nuclear tests," Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said on Wednesday expressing hope that an agreement may be reached with the United States on a complete and universal test ban.

Addressing heads of Russian mass media he said a formula may be worked out which will allow "not to begin another round of tests, but to move to an agreement on their complete and universal ban."

The minister said this can be achieved through bilateral negotiation channels and the Geneva conference on disarmament.

However, he warned that if any country resumes nuclear tests Russia will follow suit.

"I would not like that even a limited round of tests is held. It is clear that in the nuclear age it is hard to expect that some countries conduct such a round while others refrain from it completely," Kozyrev said.

**Government Statement**

*PM2506085593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 25 Jun 93 First Edition p 1*

[Statement No. 5212-1 of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic "On Moratorium on Nuclear Tests"]

[Text] In October 1992 with the accession of France and the United States to the moratorium on nuclear tests announced by Russia a real prospect was opened up for the conclusion of a treaty on a total ban on nuclear tests which are used as a means of improving weapons of mass destruction, cause considerable damage to the health of the world's population and to the environment, and divert large material and financial assets.

But despite the numerous appeals from the public and the Russian people's deputies despite the intention of the Russian and U.S. presidents, announced in Vancouver in April 1993, to begin talks in the very near future on this problem of vital importance to mankind, they have still not begun.

It is obvious that certain forces are seeking to thwart the agreements which have been reached and to launch a new stage of nuclear tests.

This a dangerous threat to the world, the threat of the destruction of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty, which expires in 1995.

Under these conditions we again appeal to the parliaments of the nuclear states—the United States, Britain, France, and China—asking them to hold a working meeting of parliamentarians to elaborate a program of actions aimed at preventing another spiral of the nuclear arms race.

We support Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin's position regarding Russia's readiness to extend the moratorium beyond 1 July 1993 if the United States does not resume its tests.

We have the opportunity of halting the nuclear madness. It is the duty of the parliaments and governments of the nuclear states not to let slip this historic chance.

[signed] THe Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic, Moscow, House of Soviets of Russia, 17 June 1993.

**Parliamentary Body Issues Statement**

*LD2806104093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 0955 GMT 28 Jun 93*

[ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jun (TASS)—The Soviet of the Republic, one of the two equal chambers of the Russian parliament, issued a statement today proposing that the parliaments of the nuclear states—the United States,

Great Britain, France, and China—"should hold a working meeting of parliamentarians to draw up a program of actions designed to avert another spiral in the arms race".

Presenting this document to reporters, Aleksandr Veshnyakov, chairman of the parliamentary subcommittee on information science and space, warned that by 1995 the nuclear club could have as many as 20 member states.

The statement by the Soviet of the Republic stresses that in spite of the moratorium, "certain forces" are aspiring to "launch a fresh round of nuclear tests." The statement expresses support for Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's position regarding Russia's readiness to extend the moratorium beyond 1 July 1993, if the United States does not resume testing.

**TV Report**

*LD2806171693 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1600 GMT 28 Jun 93*

[Video report by correspondent V. Budnikov, including recorded remarks by A. Veshnyakov, member of the Russian Supreme Soviet; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The moratorium on nuclear tests, which has been observed by all nuclear powers, elapses on 1 July this year.

[Budnikov] at the White House today, journalists were familiarized with the statement from the Russian Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic. Deputies support within the statement the Russian president's decision not to resume explosions after 1 July this year if the United States does not resume its tests. They also make a proposal to mps from other countries to hold a meeting aimed at averting a new and extremely dangerous turn in the arms race spiral.

[Veshnyakov] We have had and so far we still have a realistic prospect for concluding an international treaty to ban nuclear tests completely.

[Budnikov] The treaty on nuclear weapons nonproliferation elapses in 1994, and the number of nuclear countries may rise to 20. Therefore, in the view of Russian deputies, it is high time for the great powers to set an example to the rest of the world by voluntarily renouncing nuclear tests. [Video shows news conference in progress, chaired by Veshnyakov, who is seen reading out the statement; also a brief shot of the first page of the statement on Nuclear Tests Moratorium from the Russian Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic]

**Foreign Affairs Group on Moratorium**

*LD2806223493 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1950 GMT 28 Jun 93*

[From proceedings of the Russian Supreme Soviet; report by Yelena Ozrina; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The committee for international affairs and foreign economic relations is holding a news conference. It is devoted to, what is in my view, a very important issue: to the moratorium on nuclear tests. Before the start of the news conference an appeal of the deputies of the Russian Federation on the moratorium on nuclear tests was handed out to journalists, as well as an article from this year's May issue of the newspaper SPASENIYA [Salvation]. We have tested 2,000 nuclear bombs. It is time to stop.

[Unidentified spokesman] All in all, in the world during the 48 postwar years the contingent of nuclear states has, according to the information of the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, exploded 2,074 nuclear charges: the United States—1,093, the Soviet Union—715, France—188, Great Britain—43, China—35. Over the last 30 years, and precisely this year, in August, we shall mark the 30th anniversary of the treaty banning nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, the air, and under water; explosions have only be carried out under ground.

I think there is no need at this time for me to report on the consequences that we have from nuclear explosions. Many of them are already known, and many still have not been studied. As a rule, nuclear explosions are used to improve weapons of mass destruction and cause considerable damage to the health of the Earth's population, the environment, and divert huge material and financial means. As an independent state, Russia has not carried out a single nuclear explosion. The last explosion at the testing ground in the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, and now that is Russia's central testing ground—that is what it is called—was carried out on 24 October, 1990.

On 26 October, 1991, the Russian President announced a moratorium on nuclear tests to which—thanks to the appeal of the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation as well, France and the United States became a party in the autumn of last year. The period

that the moratorium is in effect was extended, by Russia included, until 1 July 1993. Officially Great Britain and the People's Republic of China did not announce a moratorium, but in actual fact they are not carrying out nuclear explosions either. Thus, we had and still have real prospects for concluding an international treaty on the total banning of nuclear explosions. This is the first time that such a situation has taken shape in the world.

In September 1992 Nikolay Timofeyevich Ryabov, the chairman of a parliamentary group of the Russian Federation, appealed to the heads of parliament of the nuclear states with the proposal that a working meeting of parliamentarians should be held to discuss this problem. Unfortunately we received a negative reply from the Chinese side in that period. The United States, with its election campaign and other political and internal events, hardly gave any reply. The position of Great Britain is largely determined by the United States, since it does not have its own nuclear testing ground, as you know. The French side expressed a willingness to attend such a meeting.

On 3 and 4 April 1993, in Vancouver the presidents of Russia and the United States agreed that the talks on banning nuclear tests should start in the very near future. But, as I have already mentioned, there are only a few days left until 1 July 1993, and the talks for the sake of which, properly speaking, a moratorium was needed, have simply not started.

In the next few days the Clinton administration—and it has already been putting this off for several months now—is planning to submit a proposal to Congress of the United States, its proposal on nuclear tests. A wide range of variants are being examined. One of them was even that a nuclear explosion should be carried out on 28 June. Now that is no longer feasible. There was a variant on carrying out tests until 2001, lowering the threshold to one kilotonne. There is a proposal on having a moratorium as well.

[Video shows scenes at press conference].

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Missile Technology Conference To Be in Vienna  
28-30 Jun**

AU2506124893 Vienna *DIE PRESSE* in German  
25 Jun 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Missile Conference in Vienna"]

[Text] Vienna—For effective prevention of the international proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, one also needs control of the export of the delivery systems that carry the warheads to their targets, that is, the missiles or their parts. This is precisely the topic of an expert conference that will take place in Vienna from 28 to 30 June. The basis of the conference is the so-called "Missile Technology Control Regime" (MTCR), which has been in existence since 1987. All 23 OECD states with the exception of Turkey belong to it. The Vienna conference is the first of this kind to take place in Austria. It is being organized by the Foreign Ministry and the Economics Ministry.

[For further information on this meeting, please consult forthcoming issues of the FBIS Worldwide Report: Proliferation Issues. Ed.]

**Space Agency Approves Research, Development Program**

AU2206200093 Paris *AFP* in English 1447 GMT  
22 Jun 93

[Text] Paris, June 22 (AFP)—The European Space Agency's Industrial Policy Committee has just approved the proposed space research and development program aimed at making preparations for the future European space programs, the agency announced here on Tuesday [22 June].

Phase 1 of the program, to last for three years and with an initial budget of 31 million ECU [European Currency Unit], will particularly bear on computer technology and space robotics. Spain, Italy, Denmark and several other European countries have signed up to take part in this program, in which they will be able to include some of their own research work.

The announcement said the R and D program will "support pre- development work and demonstration flights to determine whether these technologies are appropriate for specific missions in space, before including them in the future European space programs".

It said the program will also make it possible to harmonize various projects carried out by the agency and member countries to as to avoid pointless duplication.

FRANCE

**Defense Ministry Brochure Cites Nuclear Deterrent Data**

PM2806084593 Paris *LE MONDE* in French 24 Jun 93  
p12

[Unattributed report: "The Nuclear Missile Arsenal Is Limited to Thirty Hades Missiles"]

[Text] In an official brochure on the state of the French Armed Forces in 1993 which has just been published, the Defense Ministry confirms for the first time that the Hades nuclear weapon system, operated by the ground forces, consists of 15 launchers maintained in a state of technical and operational readiness. In other words, there are 30 missiles in all because each Hades platform, which takes the form of a truck, has been designed to carry—and potentially launch—a pair of missiles. A previous edition of this same brochure merely indicated that the Hades weapons system was constituted in a regiment but gave no further details.

Originally planned to be based on 120 missiles mounted on 60 platforms, the Hades program was suspended in midstream in summer 1991 on the order of Francois Mitterrand, who the next year announced the "immediate and definitive cessation" of the program to the surprise of the General Staff and the manufacturers concerned. The Hades missile is supposed to carry a nuclear charge of variable yield (a maximum of 80 kilotonnes) according to the projected military effect on the ground over a range of less than 500 km.

Some press leaks, neither confirmed nor denied officially at the time, mentioned that the Hades fleet had been limited ultimately to around 30 missiles. This is thus the first document since then to be produced by the Defense Ministry detailing the ultimate deterrent force—by comparison with the strategic arsenal composed of submarines, Mirage IV bombers, and missiles buried in silos in Haute Provence—which cites the number of launchers. The same brochure adds that the Hades force can "increase in power within a period commensurate with the development of the international situation."

The regiment, with its 30 missiles stockpiled in depots, is garrisoned at the Suippes camp (Marne Department) and has its own independent means of communications with Luneville (Meurthe and Moselle Department). The Air Force retains the nuclear warheads at sites already equipped to house its own warheads.

On the subject of the ultimate deterrent, the document also spells out that the Air Force is in the process of adapting 45 Mirage 2000N, each one fitted with the medium-range air-to-ground missile. Once released by its delivery vehicle, the missile can carry a 300 kilotonne nuclear charge over a distance of 100 to 300 km depending on the altitude of release.

In past years France had up to 75 Mirage III and Jaguar planes capable of launching the AN52 nuclear weapon. These weapons, due to have been withdrawn from service in 1997, actually began to be withdrawn in 1991. After withdrawal they were dismantled. They have thus not been replaced in equal number by more modern arms systems as part of a voluntary policy of nuclear disarmament—and a unilateral one, since France has not signed any international accord on this issue.

Finally, the Defense Ministry brochure says with regard to the strategic force that the fleet of Mirage IV P nuclear bombers now stands at 15 planes. Previously it was 18. In principle the Mirage IV P, armed with medium-range air-to-ground missiles, would remain in operational service until 1996. It is planned that its duties will be transferred to the Rafale at the end of this century.

#### Possible Extension of Nuclear Test Moratorium Viewed

PM2506112893 Paris *LIBERATION* in French  
23 Jun 93 p 18

[Patrick Sabatier report: "Nuclear Tests: Moratorium Ultimately"]

[Text] This week Bill Clinton is due to make one of the most controversial decisions of his young presidency and one which is fraught with consequences for the future of the planet. The 9-month "moratorium" on nuclear tests announced in October 1992 by the United States and Russia ends on 1 July. A strong current of opinion even within the American Administration (in this instance the Disarmament Agency and the Department of Energy), is asking him to extend it. The Pentagon and some of his national security advisers are advising him to resume the tests at the end of the year, at least for a limited period—until 1996—and a smaller number of tests (15, including 3 for the British nuclear program).

From that date, tests would be completely abandoned and a treaty totally banning them would be put forward by Washington. Clinton's decision will therefore not just affect the United States: The other declared nuclear powers (France, Russia, China, and Britain) largely depend on it. China has ignored the moratorium: It carried out a 1-megatonne explosion in May in its Lop Nor center and is apparently planning other tests. Britain is totally dependent on the American installations in Nevada. Russia, which has lost its Kazakhstan test area, does not have the financial resources to revive a test program which has been interrupted since 1990, although it has not given any indications about its choices.

France, the first power to have decreed a moratorium through President Mitterrand, has pledged not to be the first to resume the tests. However, the new government is preparing to do so, looking toward Washington. "The French laboratories, like the Russian, British, Chinese, or American laboratories, think that mastery of the nuclear tool has not been completely established,"

[French Defense Minister] Francois Leotard explained. The military and the scientists are arguing for the resumption of tests in order to go ahead with the miniaturization, modernization, and safety of weapons. "In the year 2000, we will probably be able to do without tests," the defense minister admitted, thanks to the introduction of computer simulation systems which perform almost as well as the underground explosions in Mururoa.

The resumption of nuclear tests, however, will not be without consequences, and not just as regards the tense diplomatic relations with the Pacific countries. "What will we do if the Americans end the tests in 1996?" a top British official asked. "What will we then say to countries like Iran, Ukraine, or India, which want to equip themselves with nuclear weapons?" The fear of encouraging proliferation is particularly strong because the Nonproliferation Treaty is due to be renewed in 1995. North Korea, which could have nuclear weapons in 2 years, is threatening to withdraw from it. Ukraine is dragging its feet over adhering to it. There is no lack of countries, from Iran to Algeria and including Pakistan, Iraq, or Israel, which are dreaming of the nuclear option or already have it in hand.

The debate on the moratorium overlaps the debate on the future of nuclear weapons. This is a debate which is ultimately likely to divide the Americans and Europeans. The former are involved with the Russians in an arms reduction process (START I and II treaties) which should reduce their arsenal to 3,000 nuclear warheads in 10 years. They are expecting the other countries to follow the trend. The United States is in fact protected by the weakening of Russia. "More and more Americans are saying that they would be safer if nuclear weapons did not exist," the British official already cited explained. "That is a fair analysis."

The Europeans think they are in an entirely different situation. "Americans and Russians were aiming at nuclear supremacy," British Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind explained. "We only have a minimal deterrent force. We cannot envisage any major reduction in our forces without destroying their credibility." There was the same refusal to envisage a reduction, still less an abandonment, on the part of Leotard. "I do not intend to abandon what is the basis of our defense policy," he said. The Europeans, the strategists argue, are obliged to take account of Russia's existence on their doorstep, "and, for the foreseeable future, it will not be a friendly and inoffensive nuclear power, but a potentially unstable and nationalist one."

They must also predict the threats which might one day come from across the Mediterranean and which, according to the new expression, make it necessary to maintain a deterrence "of the mad by the strong" (replacing the old concept of deterrence "of the strong by the weak") to make potentially hostile regimes, from Tehran and Algiers, stop and think. At the most. Is

Leotard prepared to "adapt the notion of nuclear sufficiency to enemies which are different from those of the past." Returning to the hypothesis of a U.S. decision to end tests in 1996, the minister concluded by saying that "the American timetable is not necessarily ours."

### Ariane Rocket Successfully Launched From Kourou

PA2506023293 Paris AFP in Spanish 0135 GMT  
25 Jun 93

[Text] Kourou, French Guiana, 24 Jun (AFP)—European space launcher Ariane put a three-ton U.S. telecommunications satellite into orbit with mathematical precision on 24 June.

Ariane launch No. 57 took off from the Kourou Space Center in French Guiana at 2118 local (0018 GMT 25 June) and put satellite Galaxy-4, belonging to Hughes Communications Inc., into orbit 20 minutes later, those responsible for the mission said.

Everything took place according to schedule in the second mission of the year conducted by Arianespace, the firm that manufactured the launcher.

They used Ariane-42P, which is equipped with supplementary powder rocket propellants to put into geostationary orbit one of the heaviest existing satellites, weighing exactly 2,968 kg.

In addition, the perigee velocity augmentation procedure was used, with which perigee velocity in orbit is increased, thereby guaranteeing the satellite an extra year of space life.

The Galaxy-4 satellite launching had been scheduled for last January, but the manufacturer, wary after the destruction of an Australian satellite of the same type that had been put into orbit by a Chinese launcher, decided to postpone its plans.

The launching was set for 10 June and was again postponed when the manufacturer detected problems with the electronic equipment during a quality control inspection.

It was postponed for a third time on 23 June because of a storm in Kourou during the period of time in which the rocket was to be launched, which led those responsible to postpone it another 24 hours.

Since 1980, Arianespace has signed contracts to launch 116 satellites, 76 of which have already put into orbit. The 76 remaining satellites await their turn.

The total value of these contracts is \$3.3 billion.

### GERMANY

#### Research Ministry Revises Space Research Strategy

BR2806131693 Bonn TECHNOLOGIE-NACHRICHTEN MANAGEMENT-INFORMATIONEN in German  
28 May 93 p 2

[Text] Federal Research Minister Matthias Wissmann presented his strategy for realigning German and European space policy to the ministry's economic committee on his final day at work in this office. On 12 May, the minister repeated that only those projects that could be justified in plausible terms would be continued. The tightness of budgets, not only in Germany but also among her European partners and in the United States, meant that prestige projects could no longer be justified.

Wissmann stated that the APM laboratory module, the German contribution to the Freedom space station project being developed jointly by ESA [European Space Agency] and the United States, was more than controversial from the cost/usage ratio point of view: Even the scientists were now refusing to answer for its high costs. The Federal Republic was not alone in facing major problems in the future in financing its ESA contribution. ESA itself was working on the assumption that there would be an annual 5-percent real increase in contributions over the next few years. According to Wissmann, however, there was no prospect of German agreement to this: Savings were urgently required. The Federal Government had therefore "aggressively" supported the new United States Government's attempt to reduce the appropriation for the Freedom project from \$15.1 to 7.1 billion for 1994 through 1998. Future projects would have to have a more global bias, and include Russia and Japan. The intention was to involve Russia's research capacity, part of the purpose being to prevent its being poached and bought by dubious parties. According to Wissmann, it would be "enormous progress" if the Freedom project and the Russian MIR-2 project could be integrated. Space flight would in future need to be considered more with a view to rational practical applications, such as earth observation, and climatic and environmental research.

For all the considerable economic benefits that would accrue for both sides from cooperation with Russia, problems would arise from opening up western markets to Russian space technology: State Secretary Dr. Goehner of the Federal Trade Ministry [BMWi] pointed out that, though Russia could provide a cheaper alternative in its Proton launcher rocket, the market for highly-developed Western launcher rockets, of which there was currently a glut, could be severely damaged by a pricing policy divorced from market economy behavior patterns. Though the billions spent on developing the European Ariane launcher rocket had brought it a substantial 60-percent market share of commercial launches, primarily of communications satellites, the market itself

was a small one, amounting to only 15 to 17 launches a year. Goehner affirmed Germany's willingness, along with her European partners, to ease Russia's access to the market, though this would have to be in a well-ordered

manner. The BMWi is therefore engaged in political negotiations over the volume of supplies from Russia, so as to avoid any drastic inroads into German industrial capacity, with the loss of jobs that this would bring.

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